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THE LOCAL RULES REVOLUTION IN CRIMINAL
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Daniel S. McConkiet
Over the last few decades, federal district court judges throughout the country
have used local rules to greatly expand pretrial criminal disclosure obligations,
especially for prosecutors. These local criminal discovery rules both incentivize
prosecutors to act as ministers of justice and empower judges to manage
prosecutorial disclosures. This quiet revolution is now well underway, and the time
has come to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to bring these
innovations to all the districts.
Commentators have long recognized that neither Supreme Court precedent nor
the Federal Rules effectively require prosecutors to provide the defense with enough
discovery to properly prepare for plea negotiations and trial. Nor do they empower
judges to effectively monitor prosecutors' discovery decisions. Reformers have largely
failed to revolutionize discovery on a national scale, but individual districts, by
passing local discovery rules, have waged small battles to great effect.
These rules require prosecutors to turn over more discovery earlier in the case.
They expand the scope of mandatory prosecution discovery beyond Rule 16 and
Brady; they accelerate the timing of discovery; and they require the parties to work
together to arrive at discovery stipulations.
The rules also greatly enhance the role of judges and empower them to monitor
the discovery phase of the case. Through specific discovery rules, stipulations, and
discovery management orders, the rules greatly expand judges' grounds for ordering
discovery and imposing sanctions. They also give judges more opportunities to raise
and manage discovery issues at mandatory discovery conferences. Finally, the rules
expand (and delimit) discovery motion procedures.
Increasing prosecutorial disclosure obligations and expanding the power of
judges over pretrial discovery could improve the quality of criminal justice
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nationwide. First, although more empirical research needs to be done, there is some
evidence that these rules are working as intended. Second, by putting more
information into the hands of the defense, these local rules could help the parties, but
especially defendants, to reach more informed plea agreements. Third, these local
discovery rules may help rebalance the criminal justice system, which is currently
dominated by prosecutors, in favor of trial judges and defense attorneys. Hopefully,
the local rules revolution will serve as a model for more districts to follow and
ultimately result in amendments to the Federal Rules.
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INTRODUCTION
In most districts, federal judges are regulating and expanding
criminal discovery rights beyond the requirements of the Constitution
and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In particular, many judges
are requiring prosecutors to turn over more discovery earlier in the case
than federal law requires, and they are taking an active role in managing
pretrial and pre-plea discovery. They have done so using local rules,
general orders, and standing orders.I These local discovery regimes
promise to improve justice by delivering more discovery to defendants
and to enable judges to manage pretrial discovery, but scholars have
devoted little attention to them.
Federal criminal discovery is governed largely by Brady v.
Maryland, which requires prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence
that is material to guilt or punishment.2 The Brady rule can be hard to
obey. It requires the prosecutor to put on a defense attorney's hat, to
consider which evidence might help the defense, and then to guess
whether that evidence might change the outcome of the trial. Even well-
meaning prosecutors can fail to follow Brady. Furthermore, even though
most cases result in guilty pleas,3 the application of Brady to cases that
don't go to trial is unclear. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which regulates pretrial discovery,4 is a little more specific
than Brady but suffers from many of the same flaws: it probably doesn't
require disclosures before a guilty plea, and it still presumes that most
prosecutorial disclosures will be made with little defense involvement
1 For simplicity, when I refer to local rules, I also mean standing and general orders.
2 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987).
3 About ninety-seven percent of federal convictions are obtained by guilty plea. Missouri v.
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143 (2012).
4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16. All rule references are to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
unless otherwise noted.
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and little judicial oversight unless there is an appeal. These deficiencies
in federal discovery law stymie defendants, especially innocent ones,
from effectively preparing for plea bargaining and trial.
Federal discovery also suffers from procedural imbalances.
Prosecutors have too much power to withhold or delay needed
disclosures, and judges have too little power to regulate, manage, and
enforce discovery obligations. In separation of powers terms, the judicial
branch is unable to keep the executive branch in check.5 Likewise, the
adversarial system is imbalanced. The defense is unable to check the
prosecution, which usually possesses far more information about the
case. Only an effective discovery regime can redress this inequity.
Many of these weaknesses in federal discovery are addressed by
local rule reforms. Part II describes how local criminal rules are
expanding the scope of discovery beyond the requirements of Rule 16
and Brady. For example, some local rules require prosecutors to turn
over all exculpatory evidence, regardless of whether it might change the
outcome of the proceedings.
Relatedly, local criminal rules also advance the time by which
discovery must generally be provided. For example, many local rules
mandate initial disclosures within days of the arraignment, even if the
defense doesn't request them, as Rule 16 requires. Other local rules
require the parties to meet together early in the case for an informal
discovery conference to reach whatever stipulations are possible and to
apprise the court of their joint discovery plan. Prosecutors who are
required to interact with and seek input in good faith from the defense
may better fulfill their discovery duties.
Part III describes local discovery rules that strengthen judges' role
as managers of pretrial discovery and diminish the prosecutor's
independent discretion to withhold or delay discovery. For example,
several local rules require judges to hold pretrial discovery conferences.
At those conferences, judges may manage discovery in several ways: by
adopting the parties' discovery stipulations as to scope and timing; by
setting deadlines, sometimes multi-tiered in complex cases, for
discovery to be produced; by setting discovery motion deadlines; by
raising their own discovery issues; and by issuing orders regulating
discovery throughout the case. These orders in turn provide clear, case-
specific grounds for discovery motions and sanctions for
noncompliance.
Some local rules also require prosecutors to inform the court of
what they have and have not produced to the defense, and when they




will produce it or why they do not intend to produce it. This encourages
prosecutors to be more open, precise, and timely about producing
discovery and allows judges to sanction prosecutors who misrepresent
the status of discovery.
The reforms described in Parts II and III, taken together,
strengthen the role of judges over discovery, a phenomenon I call
"criminal managerial judging." Scholars have only begun to address
criminal managerial judging, and this is the first time it has been
discussed in the discovery context.6 That phenomenon transforms
criminal discovery from an essentially private exercise of prosecutorial
discretion to a distinct and highly regulated stage of the case in which
the prosecutor must collaborate with the defense attorney, and the judge
more actively oversees the prosecutor's discovery discretion.
Part IV discusses how these local rules are indeed revolutionizing
criminal discovery. First, there is some empirical evidence that local
discovery rules are achieving their intended effect of delivering more
material discovery to the parties earlier in the case. In 2010, the Federal
Judicial Center conducted a national survey of judges, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys in federal courts about their disclosure practices in
districts with local discovery rules versus districts without local
discovery rules.7 The results of that survey suggest that, in districts with
such rules, prosecutors know their discovery duties better and are failing
less often to turn over exculpatory information. At the same time, those
districts seem to be experiencing an increase in discovery violations
relating to local rules and court orders, such as the timing of discovery.
These violations would largely not exist in absence of local discovery
rules and court orders, so their increase seems to be evidence that local
discovery regimes are allowing judges to more effectively enforce certain
discovery rules. Of course, much empirical work remains to be done to
investigate how these rules are playing out in practice, but this Article is
the first in the law reviews to analyze the survey and discuss its
implications.
Second, increased discovery to criminal defendants can improve
case outcomes. Defendants with more discovery have a greater
understanding of the strength of the government's case against them,
and they can better prepare their own case for jury trials and plea
bargaining. This benefits the public because there is no public interest in
6 See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining:
Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325 (2016)
(discussing criminal managerial judging in case resolution).
7 LAURAL HOOPER ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., A SUMMARY OF RESPONSES TO A NATIONAL
SURVEY OF RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND DISCLOSURE
PRACTICES IN CRIMINAL CASES (2011) [hereinafter RULE 16 SURVEY].
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convicting innocent people, and there is a strong public interest in
convicting and sentencing guilty people through a just and effective
adversarial proceeding. That adversarial proceeding cannot function
effectively unless the defense has sufficient information to prepare its
case.
Third, local discovery rules rebalance pretrial procedure by giving
defense attorneys more influence over prosecutorial discovery decisions
and empowering judges to monitor prosecutors. Under these local
discovery rules, the defense receives more discovery earlier in the case
and informally confers with prosecutors about discovery. These
conferences give the defense opportunities to make discovery requests
that are tailored to the needs of the case and often result in discovery
stipulations. If necessary, the defense can later file motions based on
those stipulations or other discovery orders in the case.
These local rules also greatly strengthen the role of judges. They
provide for pretrial discovery hearings that give judges opportunities to
discuss discovery issues with the parties and issue orders regulating
discovery. Those orders can regulate the scope and timing of discovery,
specify how it is to be produced, and set a motion schedule. Discovery
orders become a clear basis for enforcing these case-specific discovery
obligations with a variety of sanctions.
Local discovery rules raise two important legal difficulties. First, as
discussed in Section IV.C, they defy national procedural uniformity,
which was an important goal of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Local discovery rules have proliferated, but most districts
have not yet adopted provisions regulating the scope and timing of
discovery and giving judges better mechanisms to regulate it. Thus,
defendants in districts without local discovery rules have less of an
opportunity to adequately prepare their cases. This could ultimately
result in disparate case outcomes for otherwise similarly situated
defendants.
Second, as discussed in Section IV.D, local discovery rules may run
afoul of the Rules Enabling Act, which only allows district courts to
promulgate local rules that are not "inconsistent with" the Federal
Rules. Some local rules plainly conflict with Rule 16. For example, Rule
16 conditions receipt of discovery on a party's request, but many local
rules expressly do away with the request requirement. Other local rules
seem at odds with the policies behind Rule 16. For example, Rule 16 has
no timelines, preferring instead case-by-case adjudication. But several
districts establish discovery deadlines for all cases in their local rules. In
a larger sense, the local discovery rules in many districts, when
considered as a whole, dramatically alter both the substance and
procedure of criminal discovery. Simply put, this revolution in criminal
[Vol. 39:5964
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discovery cannot reasonably be considered to be consistent with the
ancien regime.
A national rule amendment (or comparable statutory fix) is the
surest way to resolve both of these legal difficulties. Such an amendment
would restore uniformity and ensure that local rules do not significantly
conflict with federal law. Scholars and policymakers have been calling
for this for at least the last decade,8 and the groundwork being laid by
local discovery rules nationwide should make the amendment more
feasible. In the Conclusion, I list the best local discovery rule provisions,
and the Appendix provides some model language for those provisions. I
hope that the local rule revolution in criminal discovery will inspire
national rule makers to amend Rule 16 with the aim of requiring
prosecutors to put more material discovery in the hands of the defense,
earlier in the case, and empowering trial judges to effectively enforce
these rules.
1. CURRENT DISCOVERY RULES FAIL TO HELP DEFENDANTS TO
ADEQUATELY PREPARE THEIR CASES
In this Part, I describe how federal discovery works, exclusive of
local rules. I critique that regime, largely because it relies too much on
prosecutors and not enough on judges, and it fails to ensure adequate
discovery to defendants for jury trials and plea bargains. I then explain
the local rulemaking process that federal judges have employed to
address these and other deficiencies. Parts II, III and IV describe how
local rules are revolutionizing federal criminal discovery.
A. Background on Federal Criminal Discovery
Before the passage of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1944, discovery was limited.9 The Federal Rules changed that. Their
stated purposes were to achieve "simplicity in procedure and fairness in
8 See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Enhancing the Judicial Role in Criminal Plea and Sentence
Bargaining, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2023 (2006); Susan R. Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, 51 DUQ.
L. REV. 559 (2013).
9 See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.1(a) (4th ed. 2017)
(summarizing criminal discovery before the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure); see also
People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme Court of N.Y., 156 N.E. 84, 84-85 (N.Y. 1927); George H.
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 700 (1946)
[hereinafter Dession, I]; George H. Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: II,
56 YALE L.J. 197, 218-19 (1947) [hereinafter Dession, II]; James F. Hewitt & Frank 0. Bell, Jr.,
Beyond Rule 16: The Inherent Power of the Federal Court to Order Pretrial Discovery in
Criminal Cases, 7 U.S.F. L. REV. 233 (1972).
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administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay."O This
began a long trend toward liberalizing federal discovery. The law has
come to recognize three main purposes of criminal discovery: (1) aiding
the decision makers in finding out the truth; (2) ensuring that criminal
procedure satisfies Due Process and is fair; and (3) making case
dispositions, whether by jury trial or guilty plea, more efficient.11
In 1963, the Supreme Court handed down Brady v. Maryland,12 its
seminal case regarding criminal discovery. Brady held that Due Process
required prosecutors to turn over evidence to the defense that was
exculpatory and material with respect to guilt or punishment.13 The
Court argued that, without such disclosures, a trial would "bear []
heavily on the defendant."14 Several subsequent Supreme Court cases
interpreted and narrowed this holding. For example, material evidence
was later defined as evidence that might affect the outcome of the case.15
The rule does not require production of evidence that is not admissible
at trial.16 The evidence must be in the prosecutor's possession and not
otherwise available to the defense.17 The Supreme Court later held, in
10 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; see also Dession, I, supra note 9, at 699.
11 See generally Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the
Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097,
1145-46 (2004); see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment
("[B]road discovery contributes to the fair and efficient administration of criminal justice by
providing the defendant with enough information to make an informed decision as to
plea...."); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) ("The very premise of our adversary
system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the
ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."); Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) (describing fairness and truth-seeking rationales for broader
discovery).
12 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
13 Id. at 87-88.
14 Id. at 88. Justice Brennan, after noting a systemic interest in evenly-balanced scales in the
contest between often indigent defendants and the state, posits discovery as "one tool whereby
[defendants] would have a better chance to meet on more equal terms what the state, at its
leisure and without real concern for expense, gathers to convict them." Roberts, supra note 11,
at 1146 (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for
Truth?, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 286 (1963)).
15 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 40, 57 (1987) ("Evidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed [to the defense], the result of
the proceeding would have been different.... A 'reasonable probability' is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985))).
16 Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (failure to disclose polygraph results would
not have led to a different trial outcome, in part because those results would have been
inadmissible); see also Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L.
REV. 685, 700-03 (2006).
17 United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir. 1991) ("No Brady violation exists
where a defendant 'knew or should have known the essential facts permitting him to take
advantage of any exculpatory information,' or where the evidence is available to defendant
from another source." (citing United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78, 85 (2d Cir. 1988)));
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Giglio v. United States, that the government violated due process in
failing to disclose a promise of immunity to a key witness. 1
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have mandated far more
discovery than Brady requires. Rule 16, which was strongly influenced
by the civil discovery rules, now requires prosecutors to produce
statements of the defendant, documents and objects relevant to the case,
the defendant's criminal history, reports of examinations and tests, and
expert witness reports. Trial judges have broad discretion to enforce
violations of the rule.19 Rule 16 does not prescribe any time limits except
that disclosures should be made before the trial. Other Federal Rules
also regulate discovery.20
In 1964, Congress passed the Jencks Act, which, for reasons of
witness safety and other law enforcement considerations, prevented
courts from compelling the government to provide witness statements
until after those witnesses had testified on direct examination.21
Criminal Rule 26.2 later codified the Jencks Act and extended it to other
contexts, like suppression motions.2 2 Notwithstanding, the Department
of Justice (DOJ) encourages prosecutors in typical cases to make Jencks
disclosures "at a reasonable time before trial to allow the trial to proceed
efficiently."23
Federal discovery is also regulated by local ethical rules, which
apply to federal prosecutors through the McDade Amendment.24 Each
state has its own ethical rules, but most states have patterned their rules
very closely after the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.25 Model
Rule 3.8(d) requires prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the
defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
Gershman, supra note 16, at 699 ("A prosecutor is charged with knowledge of evidence held by
government agencies investigating the case.").
18 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972).
19 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d). See generally JULIE R. O'SULLIVAN, FEDERAL WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2016) (describing how Rule 16 operates).
20 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1, 12.2, 12.3, 12.4, 26.2.
21 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1964); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6 (excepts grand jury transcripts from
discovery); United States v. Pope, 574 F.2d 320, 324 (6th Cir. 1978) ("It is evident from its
legislative history that the Jencks Act was principally designed to make certain that Jencks v.
United States was not misinterpreted by lower courts to expose government files in criminal
prosecutions to blind fishing expeditions."); ROBERT M. CARY ET AL., FEDERAL CRIMINAL
DISCOVERY, 192-97 (2011) (background of Jencks Act).
22 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(g).
23 Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Department Prosecutors (Jan. 4, 2010) [hereinafter Ogden Memorandum]; see U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-5.001 (2010).
24 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
25 LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW:
CONCISE EDITION FOR THE TWO-CREDIT COURSES 38-39 (2013).
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tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense. . .. "26
The rule does not define "timely." Prosecutors are very rarely
disciplined for violating any state version of this rule.27
Finally, the Department of Justice has policies to regulate its own
prosecutors. These policies give more specific guidance about how and
when prosecutors should make required disclosures.28 The policies are
written broadly but generally encourage or even require prosecutors to
turn over more than Brady or Rule 16 require.29 The Department of
Justice provides its prosecutors with more specific legal guidance in
discovery but has not made that guidance (called the Federal Criminal
Discovery Blue Book) public.30
B. Critique of Federal Discovery
The current federal discovery regime, exclusive of the local rules
discussed herein, is unjust. In this Section, I highlight two critiques.
First, defendants don't get enough discovery early in the case to
adequately prepare. Second, federal criminal discovery gives prosecutors
too much control over disclosures and doesn't sufficiently benefit from
the oversight of judges and the participation of defense attorneys. In
Parts II, III, and IV, I describe how local discovery rules help to address
these critiques.
26 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 3.8(d) (AM. BAR. Ass'N 2016) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
27 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 720-31 (1987) (concluding that discipline of prosecutors for
failing to reveal exculpatory evidence is rare); Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The
Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 881, 890 (2015); see also In re J. Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 213 (D.C. 2015) (no
sanctions imposed on federal prosecutor who violated D.C.'s Model Rule 3.8 by failing to
disclose all potentially exculpatory information); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation
Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960-964 (2009) (discussing effective
ways to regulate prosecutors).
28 See, e.g., Ogden Memorandum, supra note 23.
29 See id. ("Prosecutors are encouraged to provide broad and early discovery consistent with
any countervailing considerations.").
30 The D.C. Circuit recently held that this guidance is shielded by the attorney work
product privilege. Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Def. Lawyers v. Dep't of Justice Exec. Office for U.S.
Attorneys, 844 F.3d 246, 250 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
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1. Defendants Need More Discovery Earlier in the Case
First, under the current regime, defendants don't get enough
discovery early in the case to prepare for trial or plea bargaining.31
Scholars have generally agreed that broad discovery is desirable.32
Judges and policymakers have also agreed, as evidenced by the historical
trend toward broader discovery including open-file discovery, in the
state systems, the Federal Rules, and now local rules.33 (Brady is an
important exception: the Supreme Court has narrowed its holding in
important ways.)34 The principle reasons for expanding discovery are
fairness to both innocent and guilty defendants, the proper functioning
of the adversary system, and efficiency.
Broad discovery is especially helpful to innocent defendants,
because those defendants may have very little firsthand knowledge of
the charged offense. They face a loss of liberty and even life and need to
be able to defend themselves from criminal charges. The criminal
process is stacked against them through the "awesome power of
indictment and the virtually limitless resources of government
investigators."35 The Bill of Rights is designed to redress these inequities
by providing the right to counsel, a jury trial, due process, and other
procedural rights for guilty and innocent defendants alike.36
A related reason for expanding discovery is rooted in the adversary
system's method of arriving at the truth. Liberal discovery enables
adversaries, as equals, to prepare and present opposing narratives for
the jury to evaluate. The Supreme Court has endorsed this rationale in
the context of notice of alibi requirements, which
are based on the proposition that the ends of justice will best be
served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the
31 Judges and commentators have long complained about this. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown,
The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1585, 1622 (2005) ("[F]ederal discovery rules... remain quite restrictive."); Bennett L.
Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 309, 314 n.24 (2001) ("[It
is commonly recognized that a defendant's access to information in the prosecution's
possession is extremely limited."). The Rule 16 Survey, discussed in Section IV.A, also provides
evidence that most federal judges favored amending Rule 16. Peter A. Joy, The Criminal
Discovery Problem: Is Legislation a Solution?, 52 WASHBURN L.J. 37, 46 (2012).
32 See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 2 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 251 (4th ed.
2017); Mary Prosser, Reforming Criminal Discovery: Why Old Objections Must Yield to New
Realities, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 541 (2006); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Criminal
Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? A Progress Report, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1990).
33 See supra Section L.A (describing this trend); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32.
34 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987).
35 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).




maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare
their cases and thereby reduces the possibility of surprise at
trial... .The growth of such discovery devices is a salutary
development which, by increasing the evidence available to both
parties, enhances the fairness of the adversary system. 37
Thus, discovery for guilty and innocent defendants alike improves
the functioning of the adversary system and promotes fairness.
Finally, broad discovery can promote efficiency in criminal justice,
by which I mean that the justice system should expend an optimal
amount of resources (relative to other important social objectives) while
still achieving just results. This is, of course, in stark contrast to the
supposed efficiency of providing minimal discovery to defendants so
that they have less fodder for litigation. Efficiency in this context should
consider not only the litigation costs to the government but also
"whether, from a pre-trial perspective, the undisclosed material at issue
is likely to play a significant role in the preparation of the defense for
plea bargaining."38 This, in turn, depends on whether the discovery will
help to "accurately sort... the innocent from the guilty... and
promot[e] reasonably informed sentencing that minimizes unwarranted
sentencing disparities... ."39 There is relatively little empirical work
assessing criminal discovery's efficiency.40
Broad discovery can have disadvantages too. Its opponents have
long argued that it would "encourage perjury,... encourage
intimidation of prosecution witnesses; and ... because of the
defendant's privilege against self-incrimination, be a one-way street."41
These are legitimate concerns, especially outside of the context of
exculpatory evidence, and the Supreme Court, Congress and rule
makers have clearly taken them into account in formulating federal
discovery rules, such as the Jencks Act and Rule 16's lack of a timing
requirement.42
Another argument against broad discovery is the costs that
prosecutors must incur to gather, examine, and produce discovery. Any
additional resources that prosecutors devote to discovery might limit
their ability to bring additional cases. Both experience and more
37 Id. at 472 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) ("We hold that the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment forbids enforcement of alibi rules unless reciprocal discovery
rights are given to criminal defendants.").
38 Daniel S. McConkie, Structuring Pre-Plea Criminal Discovery, 107 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 46 (2017) [hereinafter Structuring].
39 Id.
40 See infra Section W.A.
41 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32 (providing history).
42 See supra Section I.A.
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rigorous empirical work provide some support for this claim.43 Of
course, prosecutors, as "minister[s] of justice,"44 should not be unduly
concerned about these additional costs unless they outweigh any
corresponding benefits to justice.
In spite of these concerns, the trend toward broader discovery in
criminal cases 45 demonstrates a slowly emerging consensus: the benefits
of broader discovery outweigh the losses.46 For example, the state
systems vary greatly in their approach to discovery; however, Professors
Jenia Turner and Allison Redlich have recently identified ten states as
having restrictive ("closed-file") regimes, seventeen states with liberal
("open-file") regimes, and twenty-three states that fall somewhere in the
middle of that spectrum.47 Turner and Redlich considered the federal
system to be relatively restrictive on that spectrum. 48 Likewise, as I will
demonstrate herein, although there is a marked trend toward local
discovery rules in the federal districts, the majority of districts still have
no such rules. Furthermore, the Department of Justice has consistently
opposed enhanced discovery procedures, although some federal
prosecutors have at least nominally supported local discovery rules.49
The federal discovery regime simply does not require broad
enough prosecutorial disclosures to the defense, both in terms of
exculpatory evidence and inculpatory evidence. These disclosures are
also inadequate in terms of timing, especially in plea bargaining.
Brady's materiality requirement unnecessarily limits the
exculpatory evidence disclosed to the defense.50 Prosecutors generally
make Brady disclosure decisions in the privacy of their own offices,
43 See Ben Grunwald, The Fragile Promise of Open-File Discovery, 49 CONN. L. REV. 771,
798 (2017); Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal
Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285 (2016). When I was an Assistant
United States Attorney, our office received training about heightened and complex discovery
requirements for electronically stored information. Afterward, a senior prosecutor remarked,
only half in jest, that discovery obligations of federal prosecutors were becoming so intensive
and complex that at some point, each one of us will have time to prosecute only one case.
44 MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at r. 3.8, cmt. 1.
45 See supra Section I.A.
46 Andrew D. Leipold, How the Pretrial Process Contributes to Wrongful Convictions, 42
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1151-52 (2005) (describing method of evaluating the cumulative
impact of several seemingly small criminal procedure rules).
47 Turner & Redlich, supra note 43, at 288 n.5, 302-06.
48 Id.
49 See, e.g., Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.
L. SCH. L. REV. 969, 987-88 (2011) (describing DOJ's opposition to amending Rule 16 in 2003
and 2006); REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW
AND RECOMMEND REVISIONS OF THE LOCAL RULES OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS CONCERNING CRIMINAL CASES 1 (Oct. 28, 1998) (citing
agreement of prosecutors in local rule revisions) [hereinafter Massachusetts Local Rules Report].
50 Others have made this critique extensively. See generally Daniel S. Medwed, Brady's
Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533 (2010).
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without the benefit of the judge's or the defense attorney's insights as to
whether any nondisclosures are appropriate. Unfortunately, prosecutors
seeking to comply with Brady may not be able to recognize how certain
evidence could be helpful to the defense, nor can anyone accurately
predict how evidence might affect a future criminal trial. 51
True, prosecutors already have a strong incentive to show the
defense the strength of the government case in plea bargaining.
However, prosecutors frequently possess information that they consider
neither necessary to incentivize guilty pleas nor materially52
exculpatory.53 (Examples of such information include supporting
documentation for laboratory reports and interviews of seemingly
immaterial witnesses.) Without that information, defense attorneys may
not be able to pursue an independent investigation into alternative
theories of the case. The results of that investigation might confirm the
government's theory or persuade the government to offer a more lenient
plea deal or even to dismiss the case. For example, one scholar has
persuasively explained in detail how enhanced discovery in a state
murder case would have likely changed the outcome in the defendant's
favor.54
This is problematic because most defendants plead guilty without a
trial, and many defendants do not plea bargain with an adequate
understanding of the facts of the case. 55 Innocent defendants clearly
need early and broad discovery to mount an effective defense.56 Even
guilty defendants need a strong understanding of the government's case
against them so that they can know the strength of that case in deciding
whether to plead guilty and so they can bargain for a sentence
appropriate to the facts of the case.5
Even if defendants were getting enough discovery, the timing of
federal discovery would still be problematic. When defendants are better
informed earlier in the case, they can better prepare for trial so that the
jury can make an informed decision based on the adversaries' strong
presentation of their respective cases. Likewise, plea bargaining becomes
more "accurate" when defendants are better informed. In other words,
those defendants have broader and quicker access to information that
sheds light on the strength of their own and the prosecution's case.
These defendants should be able to prepare their case better and get
51 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700-03 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. Here, for purposes of Rule 16 and the Brady rule, "materiality" has a dual meaning.
53 Structuring, supra note 38 at 13-16; see also Grunwald, supra note 43.
54 Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in Criminal Disputes, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1115-20 (2014).





results at the bargaining table commensurate with their actual criminal
conduct. In contrast, less-informed defendants, who plead guilty
without a good understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the
government's case, may be waiving valuable constitutional rights in
exchange for a less valuable benefit than they realize. 58These defendants
could receive longer sentences than similarly situated but better-
informed defendants. Furthermore, less-informed defendants may plead
guilty to charges for which they would not have been convicted by a
jury, simply because defendants who go to trial typically receive much
more discovery than defendants who plead guilty.
There are gaps in the law regulating the timing of discovery.
Overall, prosecutors benefit from early discovery, because most
defendants plead guilty, and the earlier they do so, the less time and
effort prosecutors need to put into those cases. But sometimes
prosecutors possess information that they sincerely believe does not
need to be turned over, even though that information might be useful to
the defense. In other words, prosecutors' incentives to turn over
information that will hasten a guilty plea are not perfectly aligned with
defendants' desires to mount an effective defense as soon as possible and
in time to be of use in plea negotiations.59 Thus, the standards described
above governing the timing of discovery are inadequate: Brady isn't
typically enforced in plea bargaining; Rule 16 applies to disclosures
before trial, not guilty pleas; and Model Rule 3.8 requires "timely"
disclosure but doesn't specify whether disclosures need to be turned
over before a guilty plea.
Another problem with federal discovery is that prosecutors'
decisions about what to disclose are often unreviewable, because judges
and defense attorneys are simply not aware of what prosecutors have
chosen not to disclose. Defense attorneys can file motions to compel,
but those motions are not as effective if the defense cannot specify the
disclosures to which they are arguably entitled. True, as the case goes on
and the defense attorney does more case preparation, that attorney may
be able to guess what was withheld and request it, but there are two
58 It might be argued that, as long as late-disclosed discovery is included in the presentence
report, the judge can consider it at sentencing and thus, the late disclosure does no harm. That
is true in theory, but in practice, the parties have already struck a deal that may set certain
sentencing parameters in stone and the court is usually reluctant to upset that deal.
Furthermore, prosecutors who have already struck a deal with the defense have a stronger
incentive not to make further disclosures than do prosecutors who make full disclosures at the
outset of the case. For a fuller discussion of this, see Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of
Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 61, 71-72 (2015). See also Corinna Barrett Lain,
Accuracy Where It Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1, 29-31 (2002) (discussing the meaning of "accuracy" in plea bargaining).
59 See supra note 58.
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problems with that. First, as the case goes on, prosecutors' incentives to
not turn over Brady material increase.60 Second, the proceedings will
have dragged on longer than necessary solely because the prosecutor
made a discovery decision that neither the judge nor the defense
attorney could independently evaluate.
The Federal Rules also fail to encourage or require the parties to
confer about discovery. Prosecutors generally do their best to comply
with discovery rules, but they cannot always correctly guess whether
information in their possession will be "material to preparing the
defense,"61 or materially exculpatory. Because prosecutors and defense
attorneys do not always confer about their discovery needs, an
opportunity to understand the other side's case is lost (assuming the
defense attorney believes that giving the prosecutor some insight into
the defense for discovery purposes is strategically sound). A related
problem is that parties that fail to confer about discovery may fail to
anticipate the scheduling issues that often arise relating to discovery,
such as how the discovery motions schedule might affect the trial date;
whether and when an informant's statement will be revealed; when and
how the government will disclose voluminous documents, electronic
evidence or wiretap recordings; and how long any additional expert
reports or lab work might take to complete. Sometimes the court may be
left to resolve discovery disputes that the parties could have easily
anticipated and resolved by stipulation.
2. The Rules Ask Too Much of Prosecutors and
Not Enough of Judges
A second critique of federal discovery is that it accords too much
discretion to prosecutors and not enough oversight ability to judges and
defense attorneys. This is a structural imbalance that is particularly bad
in plea bargaining, where the prosecutor effectively wields the powers of
not just the executive, but also the judicial branch and jury.62 She brings
charges as an executive, but in an important sense she cuts the judge and
jury out of the process by negotiating the terms of the agreement,
including the sentence, directly with the defense.
Even for those few cases that go to trial, the judge and defense
attorney are hampered in their roles if the prosecution does not make
timely, sufficient disclosures. The adversary system suffers where the
60 See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2015).
61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
62 Structuring, supra note 38, at 8-12, 20-22; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of
Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1012-20 (2006).
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defense is unable to prepare and present an informed case to the jury
that tests the prosecutor's ability to prove the charges beyond a
reasonable doubt. And judges without a full picture of the facts cannot
make correct rulings or sentencing decisions.
Unfortunately, a significant weakness of materiality under Brady
and Rule 16 is that prosecutors determine what to turn over and when,
with little effective oversight. (Of course, federal prosecutors must
comply with DOJ discovery policies too, but those policies are general
and allow for maximum prosecutorial discretion in discovery.) In
particular, Brady itself is an appellate remedy and its materiality
standard requires a post-trial perspective.63 Trial judges who want to
ensure fair proceedings need a different standard. While Rule 16 has its
own pretrial materiality standard, the procedures effectuating that
standard are deficient.
In fact, the procedural mechanisms for enforcing federal discovery
rules are weak generally, because they do not give judges effective
oversight over prosecutors. It starts with the rules' failure to require the
parties, as in civil cases, to create a joint discovery plan.64 Without that
conference between the parties, they are less likely to enter into
stipulations. Rule 17.1 permits but does not require the court to hold a
pretrial conference about discovery. That conference would give the
judge an opportunity to become educated about discovery issues and to
enter case-specific orders that could become a strong basis for later
rulings. The rules do not require the parties to make a record of their
disclosures, intended disclosures, and withheld disclosures.
In fact, the Federal Rules generally do not contemplate that
discovery will be at issue in the case unless the parties file discovery
motions. But because the parties may often lack specific bases for
discovery motions, they may file boilerplate motions. 65 Judges in civil
and criminal cases alike know that discovery motions can gum up the
docket and require judges to wade into a time-consuming thicket.66
Such issues might more efficiently be solved if the parties were required
to meet and confer before filing discovery motions, as in civil practice.67
In sum, the federal discovery regime does not give sufficient
discovery to defendants and does not empower judges to effectively
63 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963).
64 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
65 See, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 ("This rule is intended to ... eliminate the
practice of routinely filing perfunctory and duplicative discovery motions."); N.D. FLA. LOCAL
R. 26.2(a) (same); N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1(a) (same).
66 See Massachusetts Local Rules Report, supra note 49, at 6 (describing boilerplate discovery
motions and responses: "[a]s a result, word processors tend to respond to each other").
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
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manage and oversee pretrial discovery. The next subpart addresses how
district judges have responded to these problems.
C. Legal Authority for the Revolution
Expanding the rights of the accused is usually unpopular, and
reforming federal discovery has proved difficult. In 2012, a bill in
Congress died in committee that would have required federal
prosecutors to disclose information "that may reasonably appear to be
favorable to the defendant ... without delay after arraignment and
before the entry of any guilty plea."68 The Department of Justice has
adopted somewhat liberal internal discovery policies but has fought
attempts to amend Rule 16 along those lines.69
In the face of legislative and rulemaking inaction, district judges
nationwide have chosen to reform federal discovery one district at a
time through local discovery procedures.70 Nearly half of the districts
have reformed discovery by local rules.71 They have done so under the
authority of the Rules Enabling Act, which allows district courts to make
rules governing the practice in their own districts.72 A majority of the
68 See Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 3014 (2012).
69 See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 23; see also RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at 3.
70 Most districts do not make public a history of their local rules, but it appears that the
local discovery rules discussed herein were promulgated starting in the 1990s to the present.
See, e.g., S.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 88.10 (Local Rule 88.10, "Criminal Discovery," was made effective
on December 1, 1994); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1-116.6 (local discovery rules adopted in 1990,
major revisions in 1998); Standing Order regarding Discovery in Criminal Cases, No. 06-085
(W.D. Mich. 2006) [hereinafter W.D. Mich. Standing Order]; D. MINN. LOCAL R. 12.1 (adopted
effective October 13, 2014); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (Local Rule 16.1, "Pretrial
Discovery and Inspection," was made effective on January 1, 1998).
71 See, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; S.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; D. ALASKA
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; D. ARiz. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1-16.2; E.D. CAL. LOCAL R. 440; N.D.
CAL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; D. CONN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a); D.D.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1;
N.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 26.2; S.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 88.10; N.D. GA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; S.D. GA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; C.D. ILL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D.
ILL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D. IOWA LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; S.D. IOWA LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16;
D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1-116.6; D. MINN. LOCAL R. 12.1; D. MONT. LOCAL R. CRiM. P. 16.1; D.
NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1; D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1;
D.N.M. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1; E.D.N.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16.1; D. N. MAR. I. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1; E.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D. OKLA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1-16.2; E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16.1; W.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; D.R.I. LOCAL R. 16; D.S.D. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1, 47.1;
E.D. TENN. LOCAL R. 16.2; M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01; W.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16.1, W.D. TEx. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16, app. 16 at 3 (Disclosure Agreement Checklist); D. UTAH
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1; D. VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; E.D. WASH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; W.D.
WASH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01-16.12, 47.01; E.D. Wis.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.
72 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (2012); FED. R. CRIM. P. 57; Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers
Analysis as a Method for Determining the Validity of Federal District Courts' Exercise of Local
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district judges may enact local criminal rules "after giving appropriate
public notice and an opportunity to comment." 73The new rules must be
"consistent with" federal law.74 The rules are generally binding, although
judges have discretion in whether and how to apply them in individual
cases. 75 For example, judges need not apply local rules where doing so
would work a manifest injustice.76
Relatedly, many district courts have sought to regulate criminal
discovery without resorting to the formal local rulemaking process by a
majority of judges. District judges have used alternative means to
regulate discovery: district-wide general orders,77 other standing
orders,78 voluntary rules of civility,79 and Speedy Trial Act plans.80
Judges acting alone have issued standing orders (sometimes called "local
Rulemaking Power: Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute Resolution, 23
CONN. L. REV. 483, 487-88 (1991). Local criminal rules were formerly regulated under the
Criminal Rules Enabling Act until 1988, when Congress amended the Rules Enabling Act to
encompass both civil and criminal rules. Max Minzner, The Criminal Rules Enabling Act, 46 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1047, 1058 (2012).
73 FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1).
74 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012); see infra Section IV.D.
75 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 12 FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 3153 (2d ed. 2017) (citing
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183 (2013), and some contrary authority).
76 See, e.g., Note, Rule 83 and the Local Federal Rules, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1251, 1264 n.70
(1967) (citing United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1956)) (discussing cases along
spectrum, from courts use of minimal to maximal discretion in disregarding local rules).
77 See, e.g., In re Criminal Trial Scheduling and Discovery, Standing Order No. 15-2 (D.N.J.
2015) [hereinafter D.N.J. Standing Order] (signed by the Chief Judge only); General Order
Regarding Best Practices for Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases,
G.O. 09-05 (W.D. Ok. 2009). Other "general orders" have not applied to all cases. Instead, the
same order was entered in several or all cases. See, e.g., Revised Criminal Procedural Order,
General Order No. 242 (D. Idaho 2010) (revised Dec. 2014).
78 D. CONN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a); Standing Order for Discovery and Inspection and
Fixing Motion Cut-Off Date in Criminal Cases, No. 03-AO-027 (E.D. Mich. 2003) [hereinafter
E.D. Mich. Standing Order]; S.D. W. Va. Arraignment Order and Standard Discovery Requests
(S.D. W. Va. 2017) (effectuates LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1); W.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra
note 70; D.N.J. Standing Order, supra note 77; cf Stipulated Discovery Order (N.D. Iowa 2017)
(Standard Criminal Trial Management Order regulating Jencks Act disclosures).
79 See, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOCAL R. Civ. P. 83.1(g); E.D. WASH. LOCAL R. 83.1(k); Civility
Principles Administrative Order, No. 08-AO-009 (E.D. Mich. 2008); STATE BAR OF CA.,
CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GUIDELINES OF CIVILITY AND PROFESSIONALISM (2017), http://
www.cacd.uscourts.gov/attorneys/admissions/civility-and-professionalism-guidelines; D.C.
BAR, VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CIVILITY IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (2017), https://
www.dcbar.org/bar-resources/legal-ethics/voluntary-standards-for-civility (attached as
appendix to local rules); MICHIGAN BAR, STANDARDS FOR CIVILITY IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(2017); see also PROFESSIONALISM CODES (AM. BAR ASS'N 2017) , https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/professional-responsibility/committees commissions/standingcommitteeon
professionalism2/professionalismcodes.html (list of civility codes in state and federal courts).
These civility guidelines are generally not a basis for sanctions.
s0 18 U.S.C. § 3165 (2012) (requiring "each district court" to prepare a Speedy Trial Act
plan, which must be approved by a reviewing panel and forwarded to the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts).
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local rules") for all criminal cases in their courtroom.81 Some of these
districts have local rules and other local policies.82 What local rules and
all these other forms of discovery regulation have in common is that
they conserve judicial resources by allowing judges to make policies that
regulate discovery in all cases, instead of deciding discovery case-by-
case. 83
Despite the importance and variety of local criminal discovery
procedures, scholars have paid little attention to them.84 I describe
several such procedures in the rest of this Article and explain how local
discovery rules help to address the two critiques described in this Part.
First, in Sections II.A and II.B, I describe how these local rules are
designed to broaden the scope and quicken the timing of discovery. The
rest of Parts II and III describe other local procedures that facilitate
broad, early discovery, and Section IV.A describes evidence that these
local rules are working in practice. Second, I discuss in Section IV.B how
these local rules limit the power of prosecutors in discovery by
strengthening judicial monitoring and giving the defense more
opportunities to confer with the prosecution, arrive at stipulations, and
file motions to compel discovery.
II. LOCAL RULES THAT STRENGTHEN PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE
OBLIGATIONS
This Part considers how local rule reforms aim to strengthen
prosecutorial obligations to disclose more discovery to the defense
earlier in the case. In Section II.A, I discuss local criminal rules that
expand the scope of discovery beyond what Rule 16 and the Brady rule
require. Section II.B describes local discovery rules that advance the
time by which discovery must generally be provided.
Local rules regulating the scope and timing of discovery are
particularly significant for defendants in plea bargaining: most
defendants plead guilty, and the "discount" they receive for doing so can
depend, to some extent, on how early in the case they plead guilty.85
81 See, e.g., Emmet G. Sullivan, District J., Standing Brady Order (D.D.C. 2017) (issued in
every case, regulating disclosure of Brady material).
82 See, e.g., D. CONN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16 (incorporating standing discovery order
published in the criminal appendix to the local rules); S.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1
(incorporating the Arraignment Order and Standard Discovery Request); General Order
Regarding Best Practices for Electronic Discovery of Documentary Materials in Criminal Cases,
G.O. 09-05 (W.D. Okla. 2009).
83 See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 4-8 (1978).
84 But see, e.g., Minzner, supra note 72; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 75, at § 3152.
85 Mary Patrice Brown & Stevan E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: Prosecutorial Perspectives
on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1065 (2006)
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Furthermore, defendants who receive more discovery earlier in the case
have a greater opportunity (assuming their attorney competently makes
use of the disclosures) to prepare for plea discussions. This may allow
defendants to enter into fairer and more fully informed pleas earlier in
the case. This benefit is especially important to factually innocent
defendants.
Section II.C describes local rules requiring prosecutors to inform
the court of what they have and have not produced to the defense, and
when they will produce it. These rules encourage prosecutors to be more
transparent and timely in producing discovery and allow judges to
sanction prosecutors who misrepresent the status of discovery.
Finally, I describe in Section II.D several local rules that require the
parties to confer about discovery outside of court and, if possible, to
reach stipulations and apprise the court of their joint discovery plan.
This may help prosecutors to better fulfill their discovery duties, to the
extent that such conferences provide defense attorneys with
opportunities to make case-specific discovery requests; remind
prosecutors of their discovery duties; and result in stipulations which
specify how those duties apply to particular cases. Section III.A
additionally considers how such conferences can give judges clear, case-
specific grounds for enforcing prosecutorial discovery duties.
A. Expanding the Scope of Discovery
Rule 16 requires the prosecution to provide, upon the defendant's
request, discovery that is "material to preparing the defense [or that] the
government intends to use [] in its case-in-chief," and lists certain
categories of evidence that must be turned over without regard to
materiality (such as the defendant's statement and criminal history).
This triggers the defendant's reciprocal discovery obligations.86 Courts
have interpreted Rule 16's materiality standard as follows: "There must
be some indication that the pretrial disclosure of the disputed evidence
would have enabled the defendant significantly to alter the quantum of
proof in his favor."87 It does not matter whether material evidence itself
is inculpatory or exculpatory.88 Instead, the policy behind Rule 16
"materiality" has to do with defense preparation. Indeed, the Advisory
("As a general matter it makes sense for a defendant who is inclined to plead guilty to do so as
early as possible, since the government's plea offer rarely improves with time.").
86 FED. R. CRiM. P. 16(a)(1).
87 United States v. Ross, 511 F.2d 757, 763 (5th Cir. 1975).
88 United States v. Baker, 453 F.3d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 2006) (Rule 16 requires production of




Committee intended Rule 16 to "contribute ... to the fair and efficient
administration of criminal justice by providing the defendant with
enough information to make an informed decision as to plea."89
Rule 16 materiality is thus broader than Brady, which does not
require evidence to be turned over unless it is both material (not just to
preparing the defense as in Rule 16, but to the outcome of the case)90
and exculpatory. Additionally, Brady materiality is measured by
whether the information "consists of, or would lead directly to, evidence
admissible at trial for either substantive or impeachment purposes."91 In
contrast, Rule 16 materiality is broader, because it is measured by
whether there is a "strong indication" that the disclosure would "play an
important role in uncovering admissible evidence, aiding witness
preparation, corroborating testimony, or assisting impeachment or
rebuttal."92 Finally, whereas Rule 16 is enforced in trial courts, Brady is
usually enforced on appeal when finality interests are strong.93
Many districts have broadened the scope of discovery by local rule.
They have done so by adding several categories of evidence that must be
turned over, regardless of whether they are material to the preparation
of the defense. These include search warrants and supporting
affidavits,94 court orders and other documentation relating to wiretaps,95
written descriptions of any consensual interceptions (e.g., when a
confidential informant secretly recorded conversation with the
defendant),96 and evidence relating to any procedure in which a witness
who will testify at trial identified the defendant.97
Even more significant, many local rules incorporate the Brady
standard. That standard is already binding on prosecutors, but is
89 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1974 amendment (cited in United States
v. Marshall, 132 F.3d at 68) In spite of this committee note, the text of the rule fails to assure
defendants discovery in time for plea bargaining.
90 See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987).
91 United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir. 1991); see also Wood v. Bartholomew,
516 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (no Brady violation where it is not reasonably likely that prosecutor's
failure to disclose inadmissible polygraph evidence would have resulted in a different trial
outcome); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 (1963) ("A prosecution that withholds
evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or
reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on the defendant."); Jason B. Binimow,
Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to
Accused, 158 A.L.R. Fed. 401 (2015) (collecting cases).
92 United States v. Lloyd, 992 F.2d 348, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Felt,
491 F. Supp. 179, 186 (D.D.C. 1979)).
93 Structuring, supra note 38.
94 D. HAw. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a); D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-2.
95 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1I(l)(C).
96 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(c)(1)(D).
97 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(c)(1)(F). Other categories include inspection of vehicles and
vessels, and latent fingerprints. Standing Discovery Order, 15 L, M (N.D. Ala. 2017).
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typically only enforced by appellate courts. 98 Local discovery rules bring
Brady back into trial courts using two general approaches. First, dozens
of districts' local rules require prosecutorial production of exculpatory
material by specific reference to Brady or its progeny or using the same
basic legal parameters as Brady (i.e., material, exculpatory evidence).99
Several of these districts list impeachment (Giglio) evidence separately,
often allowing later disclosure due to witness security concerns. 1oo
Second, several districts require disclosure of "exculpatory
evidence" or "evidence favorable to the defendant" without reference to
Brady case law or materiality.1o' A few districts do so explicitly, with
language such as "without regard to materiality." 102 At least seven others
do so implicitly. 103These local rules (and general and standing orders)104
greatly broaden the scope of Brady and should in theory result in much
more discovery for the defense.105 This type of reform comes closer to
incorporating Model Rule 3.8(d)'s standard, which already regulates
prosecutors in most jurisdictions but is weakly enforced through state
disciplinary bodies. 106 Putting that standard in local rules makes it much
easier for judges to enforce.
98 See Structuring, supra note 38.
99 RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at 26-31, app. B, tbl. 1 at 26-31 (specifically Approach 1,
Groups 1 and 2, listing thirty-one districts); see, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a)(1)(B)
(requiring early production of Brady material, defined as "[a]ll information and material
known to the government which may be favorable to the defendant on the issues of guilt or
punishment, without regard to materiality, within the scope of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963)); D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (requiring early production of Brady material, citing
Brady but providing no further definition).
100 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl.
1 at 26-31 (specifically Approach 1, Groups 3 and 4). For a sample listing of such districts, see
infra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
101 RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl. 1 at 26-31 (specifically Approach 2), app. B,
tbl. 3 at 44.
102 Standing Order on Criminal Discovery, CR. Misc. No. 534 (M.D. Ala 1999); see S.D. ALA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; N.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 26.2.
103 N.D. CAL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1, 17.1-1; S.D. GA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; E.D.N.C. LOCAL
R. CRIM. P. 16.1; M.D.N.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; W.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; S.D. W. VA.
LOCAL R. CRiM. P. 16.1(a); E.D. Wis. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; Arraignment Order and Standard
Discovery Requests, 1(h) (S.D. W. Va. 2017) (ordering the government to "[d]isclose to
defendant all evidence favorable to defendant").
104 See, e.g., Emmet G. Sullivan, District J., Standing Brady Order (D.D.C. 2017). The
District of Colorado's standard form "Discovery Conference Memorandum and Order"
requests, on behalf of the defense, that the prosecution disclose all Brady material and reiterates
the government's Brady duties. Discovery Conference Memorandum and Order (D. Colo.
2016). The District of New Mexico provides its magistrate judges with a model discovery order
appended to its local rules which extensively regulates criminal discovery in all cases, including
ordering the government to disclose Brady material. Standing Order, 5 6 (D.N.M. 2016)
[hereinafter D.N.M. Standing Order].
105 For some empirical justification for this, see infra Section IV.A.
106 See also MODEL RULES, supra note 26 and text accompanying note 26.
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While expanding the grounds for discovery, some districts are also
attempting to limit the grounds for obtaining discovery to the federal
rules and the local rule regulating discovery.07 This type of provision
apparently responds to the concern of some district courts that
discovery motions often fail to specify a legal basis for ordering
discovery. Local rules may provide such a basis where Rule 16 does
not. 10
In short, local rules are expanding the scope of Rule 16 discovery.
This reform, in conjunction with reforms that regulate and accelerate
the time of discovery, promises to greatly improve criminal justice by
giving prosecutors more specific rules about what to turn over and
when, by giving judges more ways to enforce those rules, and perhaps by
ultimately delivering more material discovery to criminal defendants. 109
B. Advancing the Timing of Pre-Plea Discovery
About twenty-five districts have adopted local criminal rules
requiring disclosures early in the case. 0 However, judges in all districts
have authority under Rule 16 to set case-specific timelines even without
a local discovery rule.111 Relatedly, many districts have also attempted to
expedite discovery by doing away with discovery requests. These local
rules, taken together, seek to advance the timing of discovery to be of
use to the defense during plea negotiations and trial preparation.
Many criminal local rules require Rule 16 disclosures soon after the
arraignment, typically within a specified number of days, often seven,
ten, or fourteen.112 Many districts require disclosure of all exculpatory
107 See, e.g., D.N.M. Standing Order, supra note 104, at 1 5 ("Unless mandated by the
remaining paragraphs of this Order, evidence not otherwise subject to disclosure under Rule 16
is not required to be produced pursuant to this standing discovery Order.").
10 See id.
109 Cf Mike Klinkosum, Pursuing Discovery in Criminal Cases: Forcing Open the
Prosecution's Files, CHAMPION (May 2013), http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=28476
(discussing open-file discovery generally); see also W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a), app. at 3
(Disclosure Agreement Checklist); D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-2 (search warrant
documentation); E.D. Wis. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (open file policy); Speedy Trial Act Plan
(S.D. Iowa 2007).
110 A few districts require disclosure a few days before trial. See, e.g., D. MONT. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (requiring disclosure of Brady material and results of physical or mental
examinations or tests seven days before trial); E.D. WIS. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(4) (when the
government is following an open-file policy, materials must be disclosed no later than fifteen
days before trial); see also RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl. 2 at 32-39 (collecting
local rules).
111 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1) ("At any time the court may, for good cause ... grant other
appropriate relief.").
112 See, e.g., S.D. GA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (within seven days of arraignment); D. HAW.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (within seven days of arraignment); D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
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evidence, including Giglio materials, at a time close to the
arraignment.113 Relatedly, some districts have devised two and three-
tiered disclosure schemes in which the bulk of criminal discovery must
be provided soon after the arraignment, but certain discovery can be
delayed until just before the trial.114 Many districts require the
production of Brady material at a time close to the arraignment, but do
not require the production of Giglio material, which may implicate
witness safety concerns, until a time close to trial.115 The Local rules in
New Hampshire do not require the production of any exculpatory
evidence until twenty-one days before the trial.116
Many local rules have done away with disclosure requests for
common discovery items already referenced in the Federal Rules. Rule
16 requires the defense to request certain discovery; the prosecution, if it
provides that discovery, may request reciprocal discovery.117 These
16.1(a)(3) (within fourteen days of arraignment); M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(a)(2)
(within fourteen days of arraignment); W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C) (within
fourteen days of arraignment); D.N.M. Standing Order, supra note 104, at 5 2 (within seven
days of entry of standing order, government must provide all Rule 16 disclosures and defense
must provide reciprocal discovery); Arraignment and Pretrial Discovery Order (D.R.I. 2017)
[hereinafter D.R.I. Order] (within five days of arraignment); E.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra
note 78 (parties must meet and confer about discovery within ten days of arraignment unless
otherwise ordered by court). The District of Puerto Rico's local discovery rule states that the
"government may voluntarily disclose, within thirty (30) days after the arraignment, all
material discoverable pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 16." D.P.R. LOCAL R. 116(a) (emphasis
added).
113 See, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a)(1)(B) (Brady material), 16.1(a)(1)(C)
(Giglio material); S.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B) (Brady material), 16(b)(1)(C) (Giglio
material); D. CONN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16 app. at 147-50 (Standing Order on Discovery); N.D.
FLA. LOCAL R. 26.2(d); S.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 88.10(c) (Brady), 88.10(d) (Giglio) (prior convictions
of testifying informants); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2; W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16, app. at 3
(Disclosure Agreement Checklist covers Brady and Giglio material); Revised Criminal
Procedural Order, No. 242, f 5 (D. Idaho 2010).
114 See D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2; D. MONT. LOCAL R. CRIM P. 16.1(a) (for FED. R. CRIM. P.
16(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), (D), (E) and (G), discovery shall be provided fourteen days after
arraignment; for FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(F), discovery shall be as soon as reasonably possible
but no later than seven days before trial); D. VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; Sarah W. Hays, Mag. J.,
Standing Order for Criminal Cases (W.D. Mo. 2017) [hereinafter Hays Standing Order]; In Re
Criminal Discovery, No. 2015-5 (D. Or. 2015).
115 D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (most prosecution discovery to be provided within
seven days of arraignment), 16.1(h)(2) (impeachment material to be provided when ordered by
the court); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.2(B) (exculpatory information within twenty-eight days of
arraignment; Giglio at least twenty-one days before trial); N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1.D.
VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16 (Brady evidence within fourteen days of arraignment; Giglio at least
fourteen days before jury selection); W.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra note 70, at f E
(impeachment information to be disclosed in time for "effective use at the time of trial"); D.N.J.
Standing Order, supra note 77 (encourages early disclosure of Brady material and disclosure of
Giglio material before the final pretrial conference).
116 D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(d).
117 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a), (b). There are special rules governing discovery requests relating
to certain defenses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1 (alibi), 12.2 (insanity), 12.3 (public authority).
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requests are routine and probably only slightly increase litigation costs.
Local rules doing away with such requests require the exchange of
discovery without any requests and appear to be intended to help the
parties get needed disclosures early in the case. Mandating automatic
disclosures probably helps parties that forget to make the request; the
local rules may limit the parties' need to dispute the sufficiency of each
other's requests.n1 8
At least a dozen districts have local criminal discovery rules that do
away with the Rule 16 requirements that the parties request discovery.119
Several have done so for Brady and Giglio material only.120 Many others
have done so for both Brady and Giglio material and Rule 16 discovery
material.121 The request requirement has often been eliminated by
stating explicitly that no defense request is necessary.122 More often, the
local rule simply directs the prosecutor to produce discovery; no defense
request is mentioned.123 Other districts have also done away with the
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 404(b)'s requirement that the defense
request 404(b) evidence.124 The District of Nebraska takes an unusual
118 See, e.g., D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) ("Requests for discovery required by Fed. R.
Crim. P. 16 are entered for the defendant by this rule so that the defendant need not make any
further requests for such discovery," unless the defendant files a notice that he will not request
discovery.); D.R.I. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16 ("Within 7 days after arraignment, the attorney for the
government and the attorney for the defendant shall exchange written requests for disclosure of
material and information pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a) and (b)."); D.N.M. Standing
Order, supra note 104, at ! 1 Unless he files a waiver, the defendant is deemed to have made all
Rule 16 discovery requests and be subject to reciprocal discovery. In the District of Colorado,
the standard discovery order itself constitutes all required Rule 16 discovery requests, although
defendants who want to avoid triggering reciprocal discovery obligations may opt out.
Discovery Conference Memorandum and Order (D. Colo. 2016).
119 D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) ("Requests for discovery required by Fed. R. Crim. P.
16 are entered for the defendant by this rule so that the defendant need not make any further
requests for such discovery."); I. Leo Glasser, District J., Certificate of Engagement and
Criminal Pre-Trial Order [hereinafter Glasser Order] ("Defendant is deemed to have requested
all information subject to disclosure by the government pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16(a), unless a written waiver of such request is filed with the Court within five
days.").
120 RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl. 4 at 47-50; see, e.g., N.D. FLA. LOCAL R.
26.2; Revised Criminal Procedural Order, No. 242, f5 1, 5 (D. Idaho 2010); W.D. Mich.
Standing Order, supra note 70, at 55 A, D, E.
121 RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl. 4 at 47-50; see, e.g., D. MASS. LOCAL R.
116.1-116.2; D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1(b); W.D. TEX.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16 app. at 16-3 (Disclosure Agreement Checklist); D. VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16(a).
122 See, e.g., D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(a)(1); D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1.
123 RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at app. B, tbl. 4 at 47-50 (collecting examples); see, e.g.,
N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1(b); W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1) ("The parties need
not make standard discovery requests ... if... they confer ... and sign and file a copy of the
Disclosure Agreement Checklist."); D. VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a).
124 See, e.g., D. VT. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2); E.D. WASH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(8); N.D.
W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.06.
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approach, "presuming" that a defense discovery request has been filed
but still requiring the defense to make the request. However,
notwithstanding the defense failure to make the request, the prosecution
must still provide discovery unless the defense files a notice stating that
it does not want discovery under Rule 16(a)(1).125
The local rules eliminating defense discovery requests, combined
with local rules requiring discovery at or near the time of arraignment,
evince a policy in criminal cases of getting key information into the
parties' hands early in the case as efficiently as possible. This helps the
parties to prepare for plea bargaining or trial earlier in the case and with
less litigation.
Local rules require that early discovery could help make Brady
more effective. Brady has no time limits; it simply requires evidence to
be disclosed in time for the defense to make effective use of it at trial.126
This is not helpful for plea bargaining defendants. State ethical rules
require "timely disclosure" of exculpatory evidence.127 Those rules are
seldom enforced,128 and the timely disclosure standard in particular is
vague and would be difficult to enforce. Department of Justice policy
similarly requires "early discovery,"129 but this internal policy may be
insufficient to constrain prosecutors in all cases. First, early discovery is
vague and is to be determined by prosecutors "on a case-by-case
basis."130 Second, the policy by its own terms is not enforceable in
court.131 Third, even where prosecutors violate Justice Department
policy, the Department rarely disciplines its own prosecutors.1 32 All this
is to say that, in spite of the fact that federal discovery is already
regulated in many ways, local discovery rules could provide highly
effective regulation because they are directly enforceable by federal
judges.
There is a fairly broad range of timing requirements among the
districts, ranging from at the arraignment to thirty days after the
125 D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1.
126 See, e.g., United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1426 (11th Cir. 1991) ("A Brady violation
can also occur if the prosecution delays in transmitting evidence during a trial, but only if the
defendant can show prejudice, e.g., the material came so late that it could not be effectively
used.").
127 MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at r. 3.8(d).
128 LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 25, at 64-69 (discussing under enforcement of state
ethical rules).
129 See Ogden Memorandum, supra note 23 ("Prosecutors are encouraged to provide broad
and early discovery consistent with any countervailing considerations.").
130 Id.
131 Id. (Policy is "not intended to have the force of law or to create or confer any rights,
privileges, or benefits." (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979))).
132 Thomas P. Sullivan & Maurice Possley, The Chronic Failure to Discipline Prosecutors for
Misconduct: Proposals for Reform, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 890 (2015).
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arraignment. All such requirements must balance the defense interest in
swift discovery, which is usually a prerequisite to effective case
preparation, and the costs to the prosecution of producing discovery
quickly. It is also possible that prosecutors in districts that have no time
requirements for producing discovery, or even districts that have a
thirty-day deadline, might try to use discovery rights as a bargaining
chip in plea negotiations.1 33 This would seemingly be more likely in
simple cases, like Fast-Track immigration cases. The prosecution has a
Brady duty to turn over exculpatory evidence even after a guilty plea.134
Mandatory early disclosures pose other concerns in criminal cases.
For example, disclosing impeachment information too early in the case
can pose significant witness security concerns.135 Prosecutors must
anticipate such problems to the extent possible and seek court orders
under Rule 16 to delay disclosure.
Finally, many districts require that, where the government provides
early discovery, the defense must reciprocate, sometimes within a set
time period.136 Other districts have accelerated prosecutorial discovery
obligations without doing likewise to the defense's obligations.137
133 Susan R. Klein et al., Waiving the Criminal Justice System: An Empirical and
Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 83 (2015) ("Waivers of discovery .. . rights
are sprouting up like wildfires.").
134 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
135 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment (discussing the
court's authority to deny, restrict, or defer discovery for security reasons).
136 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(d) (unless a defendant waives early prosecution discovery, the
defense must provide reciprocal discovery within twenty-eight days of the arraignment); D.
NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b)(1) (on receipt of early government discovery, the defense must
provide reciprocal discovery within thirty days after the arraignment); D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM.
P. 16.1(b)(2) (same); N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01 (government must supply discovery
within fourteen days upon request; then defense must supply reciprocal discovery within
fourteen days); S.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (same); Stipulated Discovery Order (N.D.
Iowa 2017) (where the parties so stipulate, if defense receives government's standard discovery
file, it must provide expanded reciprocal discovery; no time period specified). In the District of
Utah, where the government provides early Jencks Act/Rule 26.2 statements, the defendant
must do likewise. D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(e).
137 See, e.g., W.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(B) (prosecution must provide discovery at
arraignment upon request, but no corresponding defense duty); see also W.D. TENN. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 16.1(c)(1) ("If the United States Attorney requests reciprocal discovery, and defense
counsel has reciprocal discovery, then defense counsel shall respond in writing at least 14 days
before trial."); D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(c) (no time limit for Rule 16 reciprocal
discovery), 16-1(e) (no time limit for reciprocal Jencks Act statements).
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C. Requiring Prosecutors to Make a Record of the Status of
Discovery
Several districts have local rules requiring the prosecution to make
an official record of what discovery it has and has not provided. These
rules can serve as an important check on prosecutorial decisions not to
disclose by putting the defense or the court on notice of such decisions.
Two types of such rules are certifications of compliance, and declination
procedures.
Several districts' local rules require prosecutors to certify their
compliance with discovery obligations either in writing, or in open
court, or both. For example, in the Western District of Oklahoma, the
parties must meet and confer about discovery within fourteen days of
the not-guilty plea.138 Within seven days of that conference, they must
file a Joint Statement of Discovery Conference, which requires the
parties to state any contested issues of discovery and requires the
prosecution to certify disclosure of several types of evidence, including
all Brady material, whether there is wiretap evidence, whether an
informer will testify, and notices of certain defenses.139 Other districts
likewise require prosecutors to certify in a court filing what disclosures
they have made.140 The Eastern District of Oklahoma had such a
requirement for a time but did away with it. 141 The American Bar
Association has previously recommended the use of criminal discovery
checklists. 142
138 W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a).
139 W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b), app. V.
140 See, e.g., D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a)(4) ("Upon providing the required discovery,
the government must file and serve a notice of compliance."); D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1;
D. UTAH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(h). Under the District of Colorado Standard Discovery
Conference Memorandum and Order referenced in the local discovery rule, the prosecutor
must sign a memorandum certifying whether a confidential informant was a participant or a
witness to the alleged crime and whether that informant will testify trial; and whether
recordings or surveillance evidence exists and whether it will be turned over. That
memorandum becomes the basis of a court discovery order. Discovery Conference
Memorandum and Order, Section ID, E (D. Colo. 2016).
141 There, prosecutors were formerly required to "provide discovery to the Defendant
contemporaneously with the arraignment_ . . . be prepared to announce the status of discovery
on the record," and file a joint disclosure agreement with the defense, to "encourage early,
voluntary and complete discovery." E.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (A)(1) (amended July 5,
2016). That Disclosure Agreement Checklist, set forth on a court form in an exhibit to the Local
Rules, forced the prosecutor to make specific, detailed discovery commitments on the record.
The Local Criminal Rules were amended on July 5, 2016 to do away with that requirement. Id.
142 ABA, Resolution 104A Adopted by the House of Delegates (Feb. 14, 2011); see also
Darryl K. Brown, Defense Counsel, Trial Judges, and Evidence Production Protocols, 45 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 133, 145-49 (2012).
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Prosecutors who must affirm on the record very early in the case
whether they have provided all Brady material have a strong incentive to
provide such material, which would then probably be useful to the
defense not just in trial preparation but also in plea bargaining, or to
seek a court order exempting them from that requirement.1 43 Even if
that court order is obtained ex parte, at least a judicial officer will have
considered the Brady question independently of an executive branch
officer.144 Defense counsel will likewise have a stronger incentive to
make appropriate disclosures early in the case, and both parties will be
on notice that, if their discovery representations prove to be false, the
court would have a clear basis for sanctions.
The Eastern District of Michigan, which regulates discovery by
standing order instead of local rules, has an optional certification
procedure.145 There, the prosecution can elect to meet and confer with
the defense about discovery or to file a signed discovery notice on the
court's form.146 That discovery notice must provide great detail about
what discovery materials are in the prosecution's knowing possession,
including Rule 16 discovery, search warrant materials, wiretap materials,
and Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) materials.147 This procedure seems
less effective because it allows prosecutors to elect to meet and confer
informally with the defense in lieu of making a clear, public record of
their disclosures.
Declination procedures are another way that courts keep track of
disclosures.148 Several districts have established declination procedures
in their criminal local rules so that the prosecution must inform the
defense of the general nature of the discovery that the prosecution is
choosing, at least for a time, to withhold. 149 Declination procedures can
143 See Jason Kreag, The Brady Colloquy, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 47 (2014) (calling for
"a short Brady colloquy during which a judge would question the prosecutor on the record
about her disclosure obligations. Such a colloquy would provide judges an additional tool to
enforce Brady, nudge prosecutors to comply with their disclosure obligations, and make it
easier to punish prosecutors who commit misconduct."); see also Ellen Yaroshefsky,
Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1332, 1345 (2011) (discussing
similar state requirements and similar recommendation by American College of Trial Lawyers;
asserting "[a]ny lawyer is likely to exercise greater care when required to certify that he has
done so to a court").
144 Structuring, supra note 38, at 39-51 (describing how separation of powers principles can
improve Brady enforcement).
145 The Western District of Texas has a similar procedure which allows the parties to elect
whether to file a Disclosure Agreement Checklist. W.D. TEx. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a); cf.
Yaroshefsky, supra note 143 (discussing proposal for checklist system).
146 See E.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra note 78, at 5 1.
147 The defense still must request the materials. Id.
148 But see FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (civil declination procedure).
149 See S.D. GA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(g); C.D. ILL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(B); N.D. ILL.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.6; E.D. PA. LOCAL CRIM. R. 16.1(c); W.D.
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be invoked where the prosecution is concerned that disclosing
information will expose witnesses to threats or bodily harm, or where an
ongoing investigation may be compromised. The court may issue an
order delaying the discovery or even concluding that the discovery need
not be provided at all.
The Northern District of West Virginia has a typical declination
procedure. There, where the government declines to provide a requested
disclosure, it must set forth in writing its reasons for refusing to do so.
The prosecutor assigned to the case150 must sign the writing and "specify
the specific types of disclosures that are declined."151 In the Eastern
District of Michigan, if the prosecution determines that disclosing any
Rule 16 or Brady materials would be "detrimental to the interests of
justice," the government may decline to disclose such materials as long
as it advises defense counsel in writing of this declination. 152 If defense
counsel wishes to challenge that declination, it must do so
"forthwith."153
By putting the defense on notice of prosecutorial non-disclosures,
these rules allow the defense to file a motion to compel discovery,
perhaps after meeting and conferring with the prosecution. Such
motions force the prosecution to justify to the court, at least in camera,
its reasons for withholding discovery.
Declination procedures are a salutary development in criminal
cases. Such procedures allow courts and defense attorneys to hold
prosecutors accountable for their exercise of discovery discretion.
WASH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(d); N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.02; Stipulated Discovery
Order, 5 2 (N.D. Iowa 2017) ("When the United States withholds information from the
expanded discovery file, notice of the withholding, along with a general description of the type
of material withheld, will be included in the expanded discovery file."); E.D. Mich. Standing
Order, supra note 78, at ! 2.
150 In the Northern District of Illinois, prosecutors invoking this procedure must receive
approval from the United States Attorney or First Assistant United States Attorney. N.D. ILL.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b).
151 PUB. DEF. SERV. FOR THE D.C., SPECIAL LITIG. DIv., BRADY V. MARYLAND OUTLINE 31
n.22 (2013), http://www.pdsdc.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/brady-
outline-final-(2013).pdfsfvrsn=0 (citing N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.02); see also W.D.
TEx. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1), app. at 16-3 (requiring parties to file a "Disclosure Agreement
Checklist" which includes lines for "exculpatory material" and "impeachment material"; the
government may indicate it has been "disclosed, [that it] will disclose upon receipt, [that it]
refuses to disclose, [or that this is] not applicable"). A District of New Jersey judge put a
declination procedure in a discovery order. Order for Discovery and Inspection, No. CRIM 06-
553, 2006 WL 3095956, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 30, 2006). I am not sure if this reflects district-wide
practice. I give special thanks to Professor Cynthia Jones for her helpful comments to me
regarding this type of rule.




D. Requiring Joint Discovery Conferences Between the Parties
Several districts have local discovery rules requiring the parties to
confer with each other, enter into stipulations that clearly define their
discovery obligations, and seek court enforcement for noncompliance.
These local rules should be beneficial by helping prosecutors to comply
with their discovery obligations, helping judges to monitor that
compliance, and resulting in more material discovery for the defense.
For example, in the Middle District of Tennessee, "[t]he parties
shall make every possible effort in good faith to stipulate to all facts or
points of law the truth and existence of which is not contested and the
early resolution of which will expedite the trial."154 Furthermore, "[t]he
parties shall collaborate in preparation of a written statement to be
signed by counsel for each side, generally describing all discovery
material exchanged, and setting forth all stipulations entered into at the
conference."55 They must file this statement with the court.156 These
provisions encourage the parties to resolve their own discovery issues
and set their own discovery schedule, although it does not specify when
this discovery conference is to be held.
One unique provision comes from the Western District of Texas.
There, the parties may hold a discovery conference off the record and
fill out a disclosure agreement checklist. That checklist reviews several
categories of discovery, including law enforcement reports, witness list
and statements, defendant's statements and criminal history, and Brady
and Giglio material. For each category, a party may state whether the
evidence has been disclosed, will be disclosed upon receipt, or will not
be disclosed. Where a party declines to disclose, the opposing party may
file a motion to compel within fourteen days of the filing of the
checklist.157 According to the Local Rules Committee, this local rule
provides a "formal means by which the parties can, by agreement,
regulate their discovery practice."158 The uniqueness in this provision is
the detailed form which guides the parties in making stipulations and
facilitates, where necessary, court enforcement of the stipulations.
154 M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(a)(2)(m).
155 M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(a)(2)(n). The Southern District of Florida had this
same provision in its local rules but repealed it on December 1, 2016. S.D. FLA. LOCAL R.
88.10(p) (2014).
156 M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(a)(2)(n).
157 W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(3). This rule was last revised December 2009, four
years before the Michael Morton Act greatly liberalized criminal discovery in Texas. See
generally Cynthia E. Hujar Orr & Robert G. Rodery, The Michael Morton Act: Minimizing
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407, 413-19 (2015) (describing the Act).
158 W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a) committee note 1.
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Another interesting example can be found in the District of
Nevada. 159 At any point in the case, the court or a party, for good cause
shown, can designate a case as "complex."160 In complex cases, the
parties must file a joint discovery plan with the court that addresses the
scope, timing, and method of disclosures, pretrial motion deadlines,
Speedy Trial Act stipulations, and "electronic exchange or storage of
documents."161 In noncomplex cases, the local rules there presume, but
do not require, that all criminal cases are subject to "joint discovery
agreement[s]" to be filed within seven days of arraignment.162 Under a
joint discovery agreement, no party needs to make Rule 16 discovery
requests and the parties are encouraged to set disclosure deadlines. If the
parties fail to arrive at a joint discovery agreement, the government
must file a unilateral "government disclosure statement," detailing
"[t]he scope, timing, and method of the government's disclosures"
required by law or that the government intends to produce. 163 Nevada's
unique discovery regime appears intended to shape the parties'
discovery discussions and encourage stipulations, especially in complex
cases.
Some districts encourage the parties to meet about criminal
discovery early in the case without requiring them to arrive at
stipulations or to file a joint discovery plan.164 An interesting example
can be found in the D.C. District Court. There, the local rule states:
159 D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1.
160 This designation is perhaps inspired by 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii) (tolling speedy trial
clock in "complex" cases), as in D. ARIZ. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.2(a), which has a similar but
much simpler procedure.
161 D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(a)(2)(F).
162 D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(b)(1).
163 D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(b)(2) There are currently no published cases interpreting
or even citing this Rule.
164 See, e.g., D. ALASKA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (parties "must confer regarding pretrial
discovery"); C.D. ILL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(C) ("If additional discovery or inspection [beyond
the Rule 16 disclosures exchanged within seven days of arraignment], attorney(s) for the
defendant(s) will confer with the appropriate Assistant United States Attorney within 14 days
of the arraignment (or such later time as may be set by the presiding judge for the filing of
pretrial motions) with a view to satisfying those requests in a cooperative atmosphere without
recourse to the court. The request must be in writing, and the United States Attorney will
respond in a like manner."); N.D. ILL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (requiring the parties to
"confer and attempt to agree on a timetable" regarding several discovery issues); E.D.N.C.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(b) (requires parties to hold "Criminal Pretrial Conference" for
exchange of discovery, not for stipulations, but allows the parties to do so by mail); W.D. OKLA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a); D.R.I. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 10.1 (requires the parties, "[w]ithin 7 days
after arraignment, [to] confer in an effort to reach an agreement regarding discovery and any
other matters that may be the subject of any motion that counsel intends to file"); N.D. W. VA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(h) (requirement to confer in complex cases); Standing Discovery
Order, 0 (N.D. Ala. 2017) ("The parties shall make every possible effort in good faith to
stipulate to all facts or points of law the truth and existence of which are not contested and the
early resolution of which will expedite the trial.").
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"Defense counsel shall consult with the attorney for the United States
prior to the first status conference in a criminal case and shall attempt to
obtain voluntary discovery of all materials and information to which the
defense may be entitled."165 This rule requires the parties to attempt to
agree upon discovery issues before seeking court intervention. The rule
is enhanced by the voluntary local civility code,166 attached as an
appendix to the local rules. These voluntary standards evince a strong
policy of attorneys working closely together to resolve issues among
themselves as much as possible without going to the judge. 167
Local requirements for joint discovery conferences change criminal
discovery under the Federal Rules in many ways. First, these
requirements make it easier for the court to impose sanctions for failure
to meet any agreed-upon deadlines.168 Although Rule 16(d)(2) already
allows the court to enter any order "that is just under the circumstances"
for failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 16, joint discovery
conferences whose results are reduced to writing or stated on the record
make the parties' discovery obligations much more specific. The court
can thus more easily issue orders sanctioning noncompliance.
Second, by giving the defense an opportunity to discuss discovery
with the prosecutor, such conferences should help prosecutors to
comply with their discovery obligations. A more open dialogue between
the prosecution and the defense from the outset of the case could help
make the defense aware of the general nature of the discovery that could
be available in the case. This will permit the defense to make additional
discovery requests. Likewise, prosecutors who have conferred with
defense counsel about discovery may have a better understanding of the
defense case, or at least of the defense's discovery requests. Such
prosecutors will be in a better position as the case goes forward to
165 D.D.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1.
166 D.C. BAR, VOLUNTARY STANDARDS OF CIVILITY IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl.
(2017) ("These standards are designed to encourage us, as lawyers and judges, to meet our
obligations of civility and professionalism, to each other, to litigants, and to the system of
justice.").
167 Id. ("While these standards are voluntary and are not intended by the D.C. Bar Board of
Governors to be used as a basis for litigation or sanctions, we expect that lawyers and judges in
the District of Columbia will make a commitment to adhere to these standards in all aspects of
their dealings with one another and with other participants in the legal process."); id. f 12 ("We
will confer with opposing counsel about procedural issues that arise during the course of
litigation, such as... discovery matters, pre-trial matters, and the scheduling of meetings,
depositions, hearings, and trial. We will seek to resolve by agreement such procedural issues
that do not require court order. For those that do, we will seek to reach agreement with
opposing counsel before presenting the matter to court."); id. 5 15 ("We will make good faith
efforts to resolve by agreement any disputes with respect to matters contained in pleadings and
discovery requests and objections.").
168 In the District of Arizona, if the court determines that a case is "complex," the parties
must confer to develop a discovery schedule. D. ARIZ. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.2(a).
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recognize and turn over material, exculpatory evidence as Brady
requires. Thus, joint discovery conference requirements could facilitate
conversations that make the notoriously difficult Brady standard more
workable.
Third, where parties in a criminal case cooperate regarding
discovery, the litigation may be expedited and made more efficient. If
they are forced to confer, they may arrive at an optimal discovery
schedule that the court needs only to ratify. Additionally, a defense
attorney that meets face to face with the prosecutor may be able to tailor
boilerplate discovery requests. 169 The flip side, of course, is that these
discovery conferences may improperly require adversaries to cooperate
to the detriment of their clients.170 That is, prosecutors and defense
attorneys have duties to their respective clients, and they should not be
made to enter into stipulations or joint discovery plans that good
advocacy and the interests of justice do not require, solely to avoid
conflict.
All these local rules discussed in this Part generally require
prosecutors to turn over more discovery at an earlier point in the case.
This is partly facilitated by requirements that the prosecution
collaborate directly with the defense to arrive at discovery stipulations,
and by requirements that make a record of what discovery has and has
not been provided so that the parties have an opportunity to file
discovery motions. In the next Part, I will discuss how local rules have
greatly strengthened the judge's role in overseeing the discovery phase
of the case.
III. ENHANCED JUDICIAL MONITORING OF CRIMINAL DISCOVERY
Local criminal discovery rules frequently allow judges to actively
manage the discovery phase of the litigation, similar to the role of civil
"managerial judges." 17 This trend could be called "criminal managerial
169 Joseph Gallagher, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic Discovery
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 613, 618 (2007).
170 See The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 349 (2009); Henry J. Kelston, The
Next Phase in the Evolution of Cooperation, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 577, 578 (2014); Mitchell
London, Resolving the Civil Litigant's Discovery Dilemma, 26 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 837, 840,
842 n.36 (2013) (citing John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547 (2010) (extensive history of civil discovery)) (good history
of civil initial disclosures and explanation of conundrum between adversarial ethics and
cooperative discovery).
171 Judith Resnik coined this term. See Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules:
Judicial and Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA.
L. REv. 133, 158 n.73, 185 (1997) (citing Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences
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judging."72 It is strongly influenced by the local rules discussed in Part
II, like requiring the parties to confer about discovery and submit joint
discovery plans, and setting rules that regulate the scope and timing of
discovery. But in this Part, I discuss other types of local rules that
strengthen judges' ability to enforce discovery rules and manage the
discovery phase of the case. They include, as discussed in Section III.A,
holding pretrial (pre-plea) discovery conferences resulting in case-
specific orders that regulate the timing and scope of discovery. These
pretrial discovery conferences are different from joint discovery
conferences. In joint discovery conferences, the parties confer about
discovery off the record and reach stipulations if possible. In contrast,
judges preside over pretrial discovery conferences and issue discovery
orders, often based in part on the parties' prior agreements.
In Section III.B, I discuss how several districts have given judges
greater authority over discovery motion practice to help them regulate
discovery. This includes setting motion deadlines, requiring the parties
to meet and confer before filing such motions, and defining the
appropriate grounds for discovery motions. These grounds can include
the case-specific discovery orders discussed in Subpart A.
Finally, in Section III.C, I discuss how local criminal rules have
institutionalized the role of magistrate judges in managing criminal
discovery. They have also specified several additional grounds beyond
those listed in Rule 16 for sanctioning parties who commit discovery
violations. Furthermore, local Speedy Trial Act plans strengthen judges'
ability to regulate discovery by mandating discovery deadlines and
through other means.
I discuss below in Sections IV.A and IV.B the practical and
procedural significance of criminal managerial judging. It responds to
the critique of Section I.B.1 by empowering trial judges to manage
prosecutorial discovery decisions, which should ultimately result in
more discovery to the defense earlier in the case.
of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 647-49 (1994)); Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 377 (1982).
172 Scholars have noticed that the trend toward judicial participation in plea bargaining is a
form of criminal managerial judging. See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible
Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95
TEX. L. REV. 325, 326 (2016) ("With no fanfare from scholars, 'managerial judging,' the
philosophy that transformed civil litigation in the late twentieth century, has finally taken hold
in criminal litigation, more than thirty years later."). I have previously argued in favor of
greater judicial participation in plea bargaining. See McConkie, supra note 58, at 65.
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A. Pretrial Discovery Conferences
Rule 17.1 permits the court to hold pretrial conferences "to
promote a fair and expeditious trial." 173 The Advisory Committee Note
indicated that the rule was "cast in broad language so as to
accommodate all types of pretrial conferences."74 This must include
pretrial discovery conferences, although the rule does not mention
them.17s Consequently, several districts by local rule have adapted Rule
17.1 to pretrial discovery conferences. These on the record conferences
are often mandatory and detailed in terms of what discovery matters are
to be discussed. Many of the same districts that require joint discovery
plans use the pretrial discovery conference to discuss and issue orders
based on those plans. Criminal pretrial conferences greatly strengthen
judges' ability to regulate discovery, because these conferences produce
law of the case that results in discovery schedules, provides additional
grounds for discovery motions, and strengthens judges' ability to
enforce discovery orders.
The District of Massachusetts provides an excellent example of
mandatory discovery conferences, but the full import of such
conferences can only be understood in the context of that District's
other local discovery rules. There, the prosecution must provide
automatic discovery within twenty-eight days of arraignment.176 Seven
days later the parties must confer and file a joint memorandum which
addresses discovery issues, speedy trial issues, and pretrial motions.
Fourteen days later, an initial status conference is held before the
magistrate to discuss that joint memorandum.177 The court may hold
interim status conferences as necessary until the final status conference;
before each interim status conference, the parties must file a joint
report. At the final status conference, the parties must discuss any
discovery that has not yet been produced and when it will be produced,
whether all outstanding discovery issues have been resolved, and by
when they will be resolved.178
173 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1.
174 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 advisory committee's note to 1966 rules (citing Brewster, Criminal
Pre-Trials-Useful Techniques, 29 F.R.D. 442 (1962); Estes, Pre-Trial Conferences in Criminal
Cases, 23 F.R.D. 560 (1959); Kaufman, Pre-Trial in Criminal Cases, 23 F.R.D. 551 (1959));
wRIGHT ET AL., supra note 32, at § 292.
175 Cf Klein, Monitoring the Plea Process, supra note 8, at 564 (proposing new Federal Rule
11.1 requiring a pre-plea conference to "make transparent and record the investigation by
defense counsel and discovery offered by the federal prosecutors under Rule 16").
176 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1.
177 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.5(a).
178 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.5(c)(2).
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The case goes to the district court when "discovery is complete" or
the only remaining issues are best decided by the district court. 179 After
the district judge gets the magistrate judge's Final Status Report, the
district judge conducts a "Rule 11 hearing" (for a guilty plea) or an
"Initial Pretrial Conference."180 At that initial pretrial conference, the
court must, inter alia: (1) "confirm that all discovery has been produced,
all discovery disputes have been resolved";181 (2) order the government
to disclose exculpatory information no later than twenty-one days
before trial, unless the declination procedure has previously been
invoked;182 and (3) "determine whether the parties have furnished
statements. . . of witnesses they intend to call in their cases-in-chief and,
if not, when they propose to do so."183
In summary, this extraordinarily detailed procedure makes judges
active managers and overseers of the entire pretrial/pre-plea discovery
process. Where the defense and prosecution must arrive at a joint
discovery plan, the defense has a greater role in shaping the
prosecution's discovery obligations. The joint discovery plan, other
stipulations and on the record statements become additional bases for
discovery motions. The court, by holding frequent pretrial discovery
conferences, can learn more about discovery issues in the case, remind
the prosecution of its discovery obligations, and enter additional
discovery orders as needed. This shifts the power in criminal discovery
away from prosecutors and toward trial judges and defense attorneys.
Massachusetts is not the only district to adopt strong pretrial
conference rules. The Districts of Colorado and New Jersey have
similarly robust regimes, as do several others. 184 Several other districts
179 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.5(b).
180 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 117.1(a).
181 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 117.1(a)(2).
182 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 117.1(a)(4).
183 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 117.1(a)(5).
184 See, e.g., S.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16, 17.1 (detailed local discovery rule plus
additional requirements for pretrial scheduling conferences in complex cases); D. COLO. LOCAL
R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1 ("A magistrate judge shall enter a Discovery Conference Memorandum and
Order at the time of or no later than 14 days after the arraignment, and direct counsel to obtain
from the district judge assigned to the case deadlines for filing pretrial motions and a trial
date."); D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1 (requires the magistrate judge to conduct at least one
pretrial conference and suggests several possible topics, including discovery); D. NEV. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 16-1 (within seven days of arraignment, parties must confer to develop a proposed
complex case schedule); D. N. MAR. I. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1 (pretrial conference must deal
with several enumerated discovery matters); W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1, 16.2 (form for
Joint Statement of Discovery Conference, to be filed within fourteen days of arraignment);
M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(a)(2) (pretrial conference within fourteen days of
arraignment, deals with Rule 16, reciprocal discovery, Brady, notices of defenses); W.D. WASH.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(a) (discovery conference within fourteen days of arraignment where all
Rule 16 discovery is provided); E.D. WIS. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12 (provides for pretrial discovery
conferences in unusually complex cases); Robert Junell, District J., Standing Discovery and
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have weaker local rules governing pretrial conferences, typically in the
form of discretionary conferences that may but need not deal with
discovery.185 Usually these pretrial conference rules are paired with a
joint discovery conference requirement.186
Relatedly, a few districts have established multi-tiered discovery,
granting greater discovery rights to defendants in felony cases (and
occasionally Class-A Misdemeanors).187 Other districts grant further
discovery rights in felony cases deemed to be "complex," according to a
classification from the Speedy Trial Act. Such cases might be subject to a
more extended and extensive pretrial discovery phase, including more
discovery conferences with the judge, more discovery deadlines, and
more judicial oversight generally of what gets turned over and when.188
This helps ensure sufficient judicial supervision in the cases most likely
to have a complex discovery phase.
Scheduling Order (W.D. Tex. 2003); D.N.J. Standing Order, supra note 77; cf D. ARIz. LOCAL
R. CRIM. P. 16.2(a) (mandatory discovery conference in complex cases).
185 See e.g., N.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 26.2(B), (G)(1) (requires discovery conference seven days
before trial); N.D. GA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1 (mandatory pretrial conference before magistrate
may deal with discovery motions); D.P.R. LOCAL R. 117.1(a) (discretionary pretrial
conferences); E.D. TENN. LOCAL R. 16.2 (pretrial conference is mandatory but the local rules
does not specify how it is to be conducted); D. UTAH. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(f) ("The court
may order discovery as it deems proper under Fed. R. Crim. P. 17.1. A notification of
compliance [specifying with particularity the matter produced for discovery] with any such
discovery order, must be made by the party required to make disclosure.").
186 N.D. CAL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a). Within fourteen days of a defendant's plea of not
guilty, parties must "confer with respect to a schedule for disclosure" of Rule 16 material. Id.
This is a prerequisite to a motion to compel discovery; pretrial conferences are discretionary,
but if held, parties must file a pretrial conference statement addressing discovery matters. Id. at
17.1-1; see also E.D. PA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (parties must confer within seven days of
arraignment and at that conference, or as soon as possible thereafter, the government must
comply with Rule 16 discovery obligations); D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1 (requires joint
discovery statements, notification of compliance procedure; if the defense disagrees, it must, in
order to preserve its rights, file an objection).
187 See, e.g., D. ALASKA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a) (no pretrial discovery conference
necessary for misdemeanors); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1, 116.5 (more extensive pretrial
discovery conferences for felonies and Class-A misdemeanors).
188 See, e.g., S.D. ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1(a) (In "unusually complex" cases, the
government must notify the court so that a pretrial scheduling conference may be held; a case is
unusually complex "by reason of the number of parties, the novelty of legal or factual issues
presented, the volume of discovery materials, or other factors peculiar to that case."); D. ARIZ.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.2 (in "complex" cases, parties should meet and confer to arrive at
discovery stipulations; the court will then hold a status conference "to determine a schedule for
discovery, motions and any other pretrial case management issues"); D. NEV. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16-1; D.N.M. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.2; N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.01(h); D.N.J. Standing
Order, supra note 77 (standing order provides for, in cases involving extensive discovery,
multi-stage discovery and a discovery conference for the judge to monitor compliance); see also
Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective
Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27 (1994).
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
B. Discovery Motions
Rule 12 regulates motion practice generally, but local rules have
begun to specifically regulate discovery motions. Many local rules have
specified the exclusive grounds for discovery motions. Sometimes they
require that the moving party cite the particular local rule provision or
standing order paragraph that authorizes the discovery.189 Local rules
may permit a discovery motion where a party violates a local rule or
discovery stipulation, thereby expanding the grounds for discovery
motions.
Some districts, in expanding the list of grounds for discovery
motions, have also limited other grounds for such motions. For
example, the Northern District of New York's local discovery rule is the
"sole means for the exchange of discovery in criminal actions except in
extraordinary circumstances." 190 That rule could be problematic,
because it fails to regulate all legal means of seeking discovery, such as
the court's inherent power to order discovery or the special procedures
relating to alibis and insanity defenses. However, it further provides:
"This Rule is intended to promote the efficient exchange of discovery
without altering the rights and obligations of the parties, while at the
same time eliminating the practice of routinely filling perfunctory and
duplicative discovery motions." Thus, the rule seems designed to
streamline discovery procedures, not to necessarily close off already-
existing avenues for discovery.191 Other rules require the moving party
to "specify exactly" the sought-after discovery."92 Local discovery rules
have also regulated discovery motion practice in other ways, such as by
motion deadlines, and meet and confer requirements. These
requirements, taken together, give the parties the opportunity to settle
discovery disputes informally before resorting to litigation.
189 See, e.g., D.N.M. Standing Order, supra note 104 (requires all discovery motions to: (1)
specify the evidence that should be produced; (2) specify the paragraph of the standing order
that requires its production; and (3) name the attorney who has failed to produce it, as well as a
description of the reasons that attorney gave for not doing so).
190 N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1(a). Of course, local rules that purport to limit the
grounds on which discovery motions can be made cannot limit a court's inherent authority to
regulate discovery. See CARY ET AL., supra note 21, at 321-47 (this may be what the drafters
intended by the phrase "extraordinary circumstances").
191 Cf W.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra note 70, at 0 ("This order is designed to exhaust
the discovery to which a defendant is ordinarily entitled and to avoid the necessity of counsel
for the defendant(s) filing routine motions for routine discovery"; providing procedure for
defense discovery motions concerning items not covered by the Order as long as the defense
has first made a formal request and the government has denied that request).
192 D.R.I. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(1) ("All motions for discovery shall specify exactly what
the movant seeks."); see also D.R.I. Order, supra note 112, at 5 III.
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Federal Rule 12 makes clear that the court has authority to fix
motion deadlines but does not actually set any deadlines.193 However,
many local rules require the court to set motion deadlines. 194 Many of
them require all motions to be filed within a specified number of days
following the arraignment. 95 This encourages the parties to conclude
the discovery phase of the case long before trial, when cases are likely in
any event to settle.
Meet and confer requirements established by local rule usually
require a moving party to certify, before the filing of a motion to compel
discovery, that the parties have met and conferred and attempted to
informally resolve the problem. 196 This is the single most common kind
of local criminal discovery rule provision. Another kind of provision
does not require the parties to meet and confer, but requires the moving
party to certify that it has requested certain discovery and that request
has been declined. 197
Such requirements serve a few purposes. First, they encourage
parties to resolve discovery issues informally. Judges in civil and
criminal cases alike know that discovery motions can require judges to
wade into a logistical thicket. The parties may be in a better position to
resolve such disputes informally. The policy behind the rules "reject[s]
the pure adversarial view of discovery."98 Second, like the local rules
requiring joint discovery conferences, meet and confer requirements
empower the defense attorney vis-a-vis the prosecutor. At first blush,
they may seem to deflect responsibility off of the court to regulate
discovery. But when combined with other strong enforcement
193 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(c)(1) ("The court may, at the arraignment or as soon afterward as
practicable, set a deadline for the parties to make pretrial motions and may also schedule a
motion hearing. If the court does not set one, the deadline is the start of trial.").
194 See, e.g., D. COLO. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1 (requiring the magistrate judge to "direct
counsel to obtain from the district judge assigned to the case deadlines for filing pretrial
motions and a trial date"); D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(i)(2); D. N. MAR. I. LOCAL R. CRIM.
P. 12.1 (all motions must be filed within fourteen days of entry of plea).
195 See, e.g., N.D. IOWA LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12(a) (all non-trial-related motions must be filed
within twenty-eight days of the first arraignment); W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12 ("Unless
otherwise ordered by the court, the defendant must file any pretrial motion. . .within 14 days
after arraignment"; the government must file its pretrial motions soon thereafter.); N.D. W. VA.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 47.01(a) (all motions must be filed "within fourteen (14) days after receipt by
defense counsel of LR Cr P 16.01 materials unless the Court, for good cause shown, extends the
time").
196 See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12.1(b); S.D.N.Y.
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12.01(a), 16.01(b); D. VT. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 16(f); D.R.I. Order, supra note 112.
197 W.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra note 70; D.N.M. Standing Order, supra note 104, at
f 8 (requires request be made to the attorney that is specific, describes the reasons for the
attorney's denial).
198 Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence,
and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2024 (1989).
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mechanisms, they should actually tend to empower the defense by
forcing the prosecutor to the table and have a conversation about
discovery. That conversation can potentially give both parties new
discovery ideas; in particular, prosecutors who are seeking in good faith
to comply with discovery obligations will hear the defense attorney out
and may provide additional discovery whose relevance becomes
apparent only after the parties confer.
C. Magistrate Judges, Sanctions, and Speedy Trial Act Plans
In this Section, I consider a few other beneficial local rule
developments that strengthen the roles of judges in managing the
pretrial discovery phase. Although no single one of these developments
alone dramatically changes discovery, when taken together with the
other developments I have discussed in Part III, they greatly increase the
authority of judges to monitor pretrial discovery. First, several districts
rely on magistrate judges to manage criminal discovery. Second, local
rules can make it easier for district judges to sanction the parties
(especially prosecutors) for discovery violations. Third, several districts'
Speedy Trial Act plans require discovery to be provided and discovery
motions to be heard early in the case.
Many districts are turning to magistrate judges to take a greater
role in pretrial criminal discovery. By statute, magistrate judges may
"hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court,"
including discovery motions.199 Furthermore, they "may be assigned
such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States."200 The Supreme Court has explained: "The
generality of the category of 'additional duties' indicates that Congress
intended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with
possible improvements in the efficiency of the judicial process that had
not already been tried or even foreseen."201 Thus, magistrate judges can
have broad authority and district courts are required by statute to
establish rules, including local rules, regulating their duties.202
Although federal magistrate judges have long been active in
discovery in civil cases, they have had a more limited role in criminal
proceedings.203 Many district courts by local rule are expanding that
199 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (2012).
200 Id. § 636(b)(3).
201 Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991).
202 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(4) (2012).




role. For example, they either permit or require magistrate judges to: set
discovery schedules204; issue discovery orders205; hold discovery
hearings206; rule on non-dispositive motions, such as discovery
motions207; determine ex parte whether certain information is Brady
material208; and preside over hearings when the prosecutor invokes the
declination of evidence procedure.209 This is consistent with the
expansion in the last quarter-century of magistrate judges' role in
federal felony proceedings.210 In short, there are virtually no limits on
what discovery matters that magistrates are being empowered to handle.
As in civil cases, magistrate judges may be able to help relieve
overburdened district judges from the duties of managing criminal
discovery. Indeed, helping district judges to handle their caseloads was
one purpose of the legislation that expanded the magistrates' duties.211 It
makes sense for magistrates to play this role, because in the last quarter-
century, the number of federal magistrates has greatly expanded, while
the number of district judges has grown slowly.212 Thus, to the extent
that managing pretrial criminal discovery consumes additional judicial
resources, it seems likely that magistrate judges will have to take on
much of that work.
Just as local rules regarding the role of magistrates have enhanced
the judiciary's role in monitoring discovery, so too have local rules that
regulate sanctions. Judges already have the power, under Rule 16(d)(2),
FT=.pdf ("The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contemplate that judges will be active civil case
managers.").
204 See e.g., N.D. CAL. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 7-1(b)(7); E.D. LA. LOCAL R. CRIM P. 12 (discovery
motion deadlines); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(e) ("At arraignment, the judicial officer shall set a
date for completion of automatic discovery in accordance with this rule."); D. NEB. LOCAL R.
CRIM. P. 12.3(a); D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16-1(c) ("A discovery request under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 16 must be made not later than the date set by the district or magistrate judge.").
205 N.D. IOWA LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16; D. UTAH LOCAL R. CRiM. P. 16-1(f), (g). In several
districts, magistrate judges issue orders regulating discovery at the outset of the case. See, e.g.,
Hays Standing Order, supra note 114.
206 See e.g., D. COLO. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1; D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 17.1.1.
207 D. MINN. LOCAL R. 12.1 advisory committee's note to 2014 amendment (stating that
magistrate judges hear discovery motions, although the rule itself does not require it).
208 Glasser Order, supra note 119 ("The Magistrate Judge is authorized to assist in
determining whether information is Brady material by examining such information in camera
and advising the government"; magistrate also authorized to decide disputes between the
parties over appropriate time periods for pretrial discovery).
209 N.D. W. VA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.02.
210 Douglas A. Lee & Thomas E. Davis, "Nothing Less Than Indispensable": The Expansion of
Federal Magistrate Judge Authority and Utilization in the Past Quarter Century, 16 NEV. L.J.
845, 938 (2016).
211 Peter G. McCabe, A Guide to the Federal Magistrate Judge System, FED. BAR Ass'N, 10
(2014) (citing S. REP. 90-371, at 9 (1967)).
212 See Lee & Davis, supra note 210, at 856-57.
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to issue various sanctions for violating Rule 16.213 The court may issue
orders compelling discovery,214 granting a continuance, 215 excluding
undisclosed evidence,216 or any other relief that is "just under the
circumstances."217 The court "may" but is not required to enter any of
these orders. Certain sanctions are mandatory where a party who calls a
witness disobeys an order to produce a statement. 218
Some local discovery rules have specified other available sanctions.
For example, several local rules state that a violation of the local
discovery rule will subject a party to sanctions. 219 This may be necessary
to effectively enforcing local discovery rules; because Rule 16's sanction
provision applies only to violations of Rule 16 itself,220 violations of local
rules might not otherwise trigger that provision.
Other local rules specify under what conditions certain sanctions
may be applied, such as the Massachusetts local rule permitting the
judge to grant a discovery motion if the opposing party fails to meet and
confer with opposing counsel within seven days of a discovery motion
being filed.221 Other local rules provide for attorney fees and fines.222
Still other rules describe how the good or bad faith of the party failing to
disclose is relevant to sanctions.223 While Rule 16's sanction provision is
already strong, local rules that flesh it out may embolden judges to
sanction parties who commit discovery violations, especially violations
of the court's own local rules. I would predict that the application of
more sanctions would lead to better compliance with discovery rules.
In addition to local discovery rules relating to magistrate judges
and sanctions, the Speedy Trial Act plans of many districts expand
213 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment; see also LAFAVE
ET AL., supra note 9, at § 20.6 (describing sanctions for pretrial discovery violations generally).
214 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(A).
215 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(B).
216 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(C).
217 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2)(D).
218 FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(e).
219 E.D. CAL. LOCAL R. 440(d); D. MASS. LOCAL R. 1.3; W.D. Mich. Standing Order, supra
note 70 ("Failure to abide by this order may result in the imposition of sanctions.").
220 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
221 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 37.1.
222 In the Northern District of Iowa, "the local civil rules govern criminal proceedings to the
extent they are not inconsistent with any express provision of a local criminal rule." N.D. IOWA
LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 1(b). Possible sanctions provided for under the local civil rules "may include,
but are not limited to, the exclusion of evidence, the prevention of witnesses from testifying, the
striking of pleadings or other filings, the denial of oral argument, and the imposition of
attorney fees and costs." N.D. IOWA LOCAL R. Civ. P. 1(f); see also D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
16.1(e) (sanctions include fines).
223 W.D. TEX. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (providing criteria, such as good faith, for when late-
disclosed evidence may be excluded); see also D.R.I. Order, supra note 112, at committee note 2
(mandatory sanctions for willful violations of order).
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judicial authority to monitor discovery. The Speedy Trial Act224 sets
forth procedures for expediting the disposition of criminal cases in
accordance with the constitutional speedy trial guarantee. 225 Each
district court is required by statute to prepare a written plan describing
the specific steps it will take to comply with the Speedy Trial Act.226
Several districts' Speedy Trial Act plans work in tandem with local
rules to regulate and expedite criminal discovery and pretrial
conferences. The District of Nebraska provides a representative
example. The rules there presume that the defense has requested
discovery,227 require most prosecution discovery to be produced to the
defense within fourteen days of arraignment, and allow the court to set
other discovery-related deadlines that can only be continued upon good
cause. 228 The local rules do not provide for other judicial pretrial
management of discovery, but the Speedy Trial Act Plan does. That Plan
requires that "[r]easonable discovery, motion, and pleading deadlines"
should be set "at arraignment or as soon thereafter as practicable."229
The purpose of this provision is "[t]o minimize undue delay and to
further the prompt disposition of criminal cases." Thus, districts may
use their Speedy Trial Act plan as an alternative or supplemental source
of authority for expediting litigation through judicial management of
discovery.230
224 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2012).
225 United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 7 n.7 (1982).
226 See 18 U.S.C. § 3165(a) (2012); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3165(b) (2012) ("The planning and
implementation process shall seek to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases in the district
consistent with the time standards of this chapter and the objectives of effective law
enforcement, fairness to accused persons, efficient judicial administration, and increased
knowledge concerning the proper functioning of the criminal law."). Several districts have
Speedy Trial Act plans, including: the Central District of California, Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Middle District of Pennsylvania, District of Maryland, Eastern District of
Arkansas, Eastern District of Michigan, District of Nebraska, Southern District of Iowa, and the
District of Delaware. These plans used to be part of Criminal Rule 50(b). See JACK B.
WEINSTEIN, REFORM OF COURT RULE-MAKING PROCEDURES 124 (1977). Even though these
plans function much as local rules and have overlapping purposes, they have a totally different
process for development and review.
227 D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1; cf M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 12.01 (making
reference to the Speedy Trial Act Plan, attached as Appendix 2 to the Local Rules); Speedy Trial
Act Plan regulates motion practice at § 4(f)(6); see also Section II.B (discussing local rules doing
away with discovery requests).
228 D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.2.
229 Speedy Trial Plan (D.D.C. 2002); see also D.D.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 45.1 (incorporates by
reference the District's Speedy Trial Act Plan), http://www.dcd.uscourts.gov/sites/dcd/files/
Speedy-Trial-Plan2010.pdf. In the District of Columbia, the Speedy Trial Act Plan says: "Unless
the court otherwise directs, all pretrial motions shall be filed within 11 days of arraignment, and
the opposing party shall have 5 days to respond." Id. at (B)(6); M.D. TENN. LOCAL R. CRIM. P.
app. 2, § (4)(f)(6) (Speedy Trial Act Plan requires the parties to first request discovery
informally and then file a discovery motion within ten days of the denial of that request).
230 D. NEB. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 50.2. Like most districts' Speedy Trial Plans, the Nebraska
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Because efficiently managing discovery is essential to quickly
getting cases to trial (or a plea bargain), the Speedy Trial Act plans are
consistent with other local rules providing for strong judicial
management of criminal discovery.
IV. THE LOCAL RULES REVOLUTION Is SUCCEEDING
As I explained in Part II, these local rules require prosecutors to
turn over more discovery earlier in the case. Part III explained how
these local rules greatly strengthen the role of trial court judges. This
Part describes important implications of the rules. Section IV.A explains
the key practical implication: greater discovery rights for criminal
defendants may make plea bargaining more accurate in the sense that
the parties will have better access to information about the case, which
should result in convictions and sentences more commensurate with the
criminal conduct.
I next turn from practical to procedural implications. Section IV.B
explains how these local rules, taken together, should strengthen the
enforcement of the Brady rule and adapt it to plea bargaining. In Section
IV.C, I explain that the proliferation of local rules fractures criminal
procedure nationally, but that fracture could be a good thing if it is a
step toward better national rules. Finally, Section IV.D discusses the
question of whether local discovery rules are "consistent with" federal
law, as the statute governing local rulemaking requires. It concludes that
most of the rules are consistent, but even if they are not, nationwide
adoption would obviate that problem.
A. National Survey Measuring Effects of Local Discovery Rules
The greatest promise of discovery reform by local rule is getting
more material discovery to the defense earlier in the case. Although little
empirical research has been conducted into whether that promise is
being realized,231 the Federal Judicial Center undertook a nationwide
online survey in 2010 of federal judges, prosecutors, and defense
Plan is cast in general terms and doesn't set forth sanctions for failure to provide discovery.
Nebraska Local Rule 50.2 cross-references the District Speedy Trial Act Plan without providing
for any additional obligation that the parties follow it. Id. Another example is the Standard
Arraignment and Pre-trial Discovery Order in the District of Rhode Island, which excludes ten
days of time for Speedy Trial Act purposes to give the defendant time to examine discovery and
prepare pretrial motions. D.R.I. Order, supra note 112, at § V.
231 A few scholars have conducted empirical work relating to criminal discovery, especially
so-called open file discovery. See supra note 43.
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attorneys regarding discovery practices in their districts.232 Largely
ignored in the literature,233 this survey provides a wealth of information
about practitioners' perceptions about local discovery practice.
The survey compared "broader disclosure districts" with
"traditional districts." Broader disclosure districts were defined as
having a local rule, standing order, or other policy requiring disclosure
by the prosecution to the defense that extended beyond the
requirements of Brady v. Maryland, Giglio v. United States, Rule 16, or
Criminal Rule 26.2.234 The survey found thirty-eight such districts.235
About one-fourth of judges and U.S. Attorney's Offices, and about one-
third of defense attorneys felt that their local discovery rule or policy
differed significantly from Rule 16.236 All other districts were considered
"traditional."237
Some of the most important empirical questions about the local
discovery rules are first, whether prosecutors in those districts are
turning more discovery over to the defense, and second, whether that
additional discovery is "material" (affects case outcomes). The Rule 16
Survey suggests that local discovery rules have in fact resulted in a
modest increase of material discovery to the defense, as well as an
increase in discovery violations relating to the timing and scope of
discovery.
The survey asked judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys
whether prosecutors understood their discovery obligations. Judges in
broader disclosure districts reported that prosecutors there were
somewhat more likely to "usually understand" their disclosure
obligations (51% in broader disclosure districts versus 48% in
traditional districts) and just as likely (47% versus 47%) to always
232 See RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, at 1. 43% of judges (644 of 1,505) completed the
survey, as did 31% of private attorneys (4,545 of 14,726), 47% of federal defenders (612 of
1,290), and 91% of U.S. Attorney's Offices (85 of 93). Id at 8. Individual Assistant U.S.
Attorneys were not asked to respond.
233 But see Jenia I. Turner & Allison D. Redlich, Reply to Miriam Baer and Michael
Doucette's Reviews of Two Models of Pre-Plea Discovery in Criminal Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 471, 475 n.18 (citing RULE 16 SURVEY).
234 The survey question for judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys was:
Does a local rule, standing order, or other policy in your district require disclosure by
the prosecution to the defense that extends beyond the requirements of Brady v.
Maryland, Giglio v. United States, Rule 16 (Discovery and Inspection), or Rule 26.2
(Producing a Witness's Statement)? For example, your district may have specific time
requirements for disclosure or mandate automatic disclosure.
RULE 16 SURVEY, supra note 7, app. E1, no. 3 at 1, app. E2, no. 4 at 1, app. E3, no. 3 at 1.
235 Id. at 11.
236 Id. at app. C, tbl. 7 at 6.
237 Rule 16 has not substantively changed since the survey was administered.
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understand those obligations.238 Defense attorneys reported that
prosecutors in broader disclosure districts were far more likely to
"always understand" (23% versus 12%) and "usually understand" (59%
versus 48%) those obligations. U.S. Attorney's Offices reported a slightly
increased understanding (80% versus 78% in the "always" category).
Overall, practitioners generally believed that prosecutors in the broader
disclosure districts have a somewhat greater understanding of their
disclosure obligations. This is consistent with the survey data below
suggesting that those prosecutors are turning over more discovery and
committing fewer Brady violations.239 It also somewhat undercuts the
Department of Justice's long-standing opposition to amending Rule 16
to codify Brady on the ground that Brady obligations are "clearly
defined by existing law."240
Defense attorneys in broader disclosure and traditional districts
were asked about the number of cases in the past five years in which
they believed that the government had failed to provide exculpatory or
Giglio information. Whereas only 40% of defense attorneys in
traditional districts could report that there were no such cases, 52% of
defense attorneys in broader disclosure districts reported no such cases.
The percentage of defense attorneys that did report such violations was
correspondingly diminished in broader disclosure districts.241 It thus
appears that defense attorneys in the broader disclosure districts were
aware of fewer disclosure violations relating to exculpatory and Giglio
information.242
Relatedly, defense attorneys in broader disclosure districts were
much more satisfied than their counterparts in traditional districts with
prosecutor compliance with discovery obligations. Whereas only 40% of
defense attorneys in traditional districts reported being "satisfied" or
"very satisfied" with prosecutorial compliance, that jumped to 60% in
broader disclosure districts.243 In contrast, judges were about equally
238 Id. at app. C, tbl. 8 at 7.
239 Id. Likewise, it appears that prosecutors in broader disclosure districts followed a more
consistent approach to disclosures. Defense attorneys in those districts reported large
improvements in the categories of "always consistent" (16% versus 9%) and "usually
consistent" (50% versus 40%). Judges, in contrast, found a very small decline in consistency (-3
in "always consistent," 32% versus 35%; +3 in "usually consistent," 56% versus 53%). Id. at app.
C, tbl. 9 at 8.
240 Id. at 3.
241 Id. at app. C, tbl. 21 at 14. Defense attorneys reporting one such case went down from
16% in traditional districts to 15% in broader disclosure districts; those reporting two to four
such cases went down from 28% to 22%; those reporting five to ten such cases went down from
11% to 7%; those reporting eleven to twenty went down from 3% to 1%. Id. Of course, defense
attorneys often cannot know when they haven't received discovery.
242 Of course, correlation does not equal causation, and it's possible that districts with fewer
discovery violations are the districts most likely to issue local discovery rules in the first place.
243 Id. at app. C, tbl. 27 at 20.
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satisfied with prosecutorial compliance as between the two kinds of
districts.244
Judges were asked to estimate the number of cases in the past five
years in which they had concluded that the prosecution had failed to
comply with its disclosure obligations pursuant to local rule or standing
order.245 This question was not limited to disclosure of exculpatory and
Giglio information. The incidence of apparent violations appeared to go
up substantially in broader disclosure districts. That is, judges in such
districts were much less likely to report no such violations (61% in
broader disclosure districts versus 74% in traditional districts). Reports
of only one such violation stayed about the same. Reports of two to four
violations went up (to 22% from 14%), as did reports of five to ten
violations (to 5% from 3%).246
Thus, discovery violations relating to exculpatory and Giglio
information may have gone down, but overall discovery violations may
have gone up. What kinds of discovery violations increased? The Rule
16 Survey provides an intriguing insight. Judges, defense attorneys, and
prosecutors were asked what was the nature of the most frequent
disclosure violation by the government. Judges in broader disclosure
districts thought that "failure to disclose on time" was the most
common violation and were much more likely than judges in traditional
districts to believe this (61% versus 41%), and much less likely to name
as other candidates "failure to disclose at all" (8% versus 19%), or "scope
of disclosure" (26% versus 31%).247
Defense attorneys in both kinds of districts believed that "failure to
disclose at all" was the most common violation, but those in broader
disclosure districts were less likely than those in traditional districts to
believe this (36% versus 44%). Attorneys in broader disclosure districts
were more likely to think that "failure to disclose on time" was the most
common type of violation (29% versus 21%). Defense attorneys in both
types of districts essentially agreed as to whether scope of disclosure was
the most common violation (29% versus 30%).248 Finally, U.S.
Attorney's Offices in broader disclosure districts were much more likely
than their counterparts in traditional districts to name scope and timing
as the most frequent violations (36% versus 15% and 43% versus 31%,
respectively), and dramatically less likely to name "failure to disclose at
244 Id.
245 Id. at app. El, no. 15 at 5.
246 Id. at app. C, tbl. 24 at 15.




all" (14% versus 46%).249 One caveat is that relatively few U.S. Attorney's
Offices responded to this particular question.250
In summary, judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys agreed that
"failure to disclose on time" was a much more common type of
discovery violation in broader disclosure districts, and that failure to
disclose at all was a much less common violation. Thus, assuming as the
survey data seems to indicate that overall discovery violations increased
in broader disclosure districts, it appears that this increase was due to a
great number of violations relating to the scope and timing of discovery.
This perhaps indicates that, in broader disclosure districts, judges were
making effective use of local discovery rules governing scope and
timing. At the same time, such districts had fewer violations relating to
failure to disclose exculpatory information at all, perhaps because local
discovery rules were more clear, more exacting, and more enforceable
by judges. Such rules would have been expected to more effectively
incentivize prosecutors to make disclosures.
Defense attorneys reported that, in those cases where exculpatory
or Giglio information was not turned over, prosecutors in broader
disclosure districts were less likely to have withheld such information
based on materiality grounds. To put it another way, defense attorneys
believed that prosecutors in traditional disclosure districts more often
determined that discovery was not material and chose not to disclose it
on that basis.251 Thus, it appears that, in broader disclosure districts,
prosecutors were turning over discovery with less regard to whether
such discovery was material.
Overall, the Rule 16 Survey suggests that, while Brady violations in
broader disclosure districts appeared to go down, the composition of
disclosure violations changed. For example, districts with local rules
expanding the scope of discovery and providing specific deadlines saw a
greater number of disclosure violations, presumably because courts
could now more easily enforce the scope and timing of discovery. At the
same time, those districts saw fewer violations based on a failure to
disclose exculpatory information.
The Rule 16 Survey provides some evidence that the discovery
deadlines in broader disclosure districts effectively incentivize early
disclosures. In the Rule 16 Survey, about two-thirds of federal judges
and three-fifths of attorneys reported that their district required
prosecutors to disclose within a fixed time after arraignment or
249 Id.
250 Fourteen offices from broader disclosure districts responded; thirteen traditional districts
responded. Id.
251 Id. at app. C, tbl. 22 at 14.
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indictment.252 Defense attorneys overwhelmingly agreed that the timing
requirements were "very important:" 62% said they were "in most
cases," and 33% said they were "in some cases."253
Prosecutors and judges saw a downside to such requirements. One
in six U.S. Attorney's Offices (17%) reported that the requirement had
caused "serious problems in some cases."254 Nearly half of the offices
reported that the requirements had caused "minor problems in some
cases."255 About a quarter (26%) of them reported that the timing
requirement had not "caused problems for federal prosecutors"256
The survey attempted to quantify a few of these problems. Three-
fifths of U.S. Attorney's Offices reported that, because of the timing
requirement, they had been unable to obtain cooperation from a witness
in the past five years either "rarely" or "sometimes."257 Forty percent of
the offices never had that problem.258 Similarly, U.S. Attorney's Offices
in broader disclosure districts were somewhat more likely to report that,
in the past five years, they had sought protective orders prohibiting or
delaying disclosure based on witness safety or other security concerns. 259
Judges corroborated prosecutors' opinions that broader disclosure
districts saw an uptick in discovery-related security issues. About three-
fourths of judges believed their district's "local rule requirements of
disclosure of exculpatory information" had never "resulted in threats or
harm to a prosecution witness." But a quarter of the judges believed that
the requirements had indeed resulted in such threats or harm in a range
between one and ten cases. 260 Judges were asked a similar question
about the disclosure of Giglio information and gave very similar
responses. 261
This survey must be read cautiously and in light of other empirical
work. As is well known, opinion surveys are designed to measure
perceptions, which do not necessarily reflect reality. Still, it would be
impossible to fully understand the operation of criminal discovery rules
without surveying the judges and lawyers who directly work with those
rules. Future scholarship may use many different methods to quantify
the effects of these rules, such as by counting Brady appeals before and
252 Id. at app. C, tbl. 12 at 9.




257 Id. at app. C, tbl. 15 at 11.
258 Id.
259 Id. at app. C, tbl. 20 at 13.
260 Id. at app. C, tbl. 18 at 12 (7% of judges thought there had been threats or harm in one
case; 11% thought that it had occurred in two to four cases; 7% thought that it had occurred in
five to ten cases).
261 Id. at app. C, tbl. 19 at 12.
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after their passage, studying the number of dismissals and case filings
before and after their passage, or computing average case disposition
times before and after their passage.
Another important question is whether and to what extent
defendants are waiving these discovery rights in plea bargaining.262
Although many local rules require disclosures relatively soon after the
arraignment and thus before a plea deal is reached, this concern could
be particularly important in cases that are disposed of quickly, such as
Fast-Track immigration cases.
The Rule 16 Survey generally measured practitioners' perceptions
about the effects the local discovery rules in their district. It
distinguished between broader disclosure districts and traditional
districts by asking whether local discovery rules "extended beyond the
requirements" of federal law, but it rarely attempted to disaggregate any
particular reforms from the whole package. For example, the survey had
specific questions about expanding the scope of Brady and accelerating
the timing of discovery. But it did not ask about other reforms, like
pretrial conferences and discovery motion reform. Further empirical
research must be conducted into those reforms in particular. Still, it
seems reasonable to assume that many survey participants, when asked
the broad question of whether their local discovery rules "extended
beyond the requirements" of federal law, were thinking about all
discovery reforms, including pretrial discovery conferences and
discovery motion reform. Thus, the aggregate data gives some sense of
their attitudes toward their local discovery rules taken as a whole.
The survey compared opinions about broader disclosure districts
with opinions about traditional districts and demonstrated significant
differences of opinion between how discovery worked in the two kinds
of districts. These differences show correlation, but the survey results
cannot prove that the differences were caused by the passage of local
discovery rules. The sampling of the survey was not representative
because respondents self-selected by choosing to respond, and the
survey data does not reveal the geography of survey respondents.263
Furthermore, individual prosecutors were not surveyed; instead, an
official at each U.S. Attorney's Office filled out the survey on behalf of
the entire office.264
262 See Klein et al., supra note 133 ("Waivers of discovery .. .rights are sprouting up like
wildfires.").
263 See Miriam H. Baer, Some Skepticism about Criminal Discovery Empiricism, 73 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. ONLINE 347, 352 (2016) (discussing the importance of representative sampling in
surveys About criminal discovery); Turner & Redlich, supra note 233, at 476 n.18.




More research needs to be done into whether and how much
enhanced discovery actually improves case outcomes. It does seem
reasonable, at least in theory, to suppose that some defendants who are
factually innocent will choose, based on the additional discovery
mandated by these local discovery rules, to contest their charges instead
of pleading guilty, thereby improving the accuracy of plea bargaining. 265
B. Local Rules Rebalance Justice System and Strengthen Brady
Taken together, local criminal discovery rules tend to empower
trial judges and defense attorneys, and to diminish the roles of
prosecutors and appellate judges. This is effectively a rebalancing of the
separation of powers from a prosecution-heavy system to one where the
judicial can more effectively balance (or check) the executive. Local
rules do this by encouraging prosecutors to cooperate more with the
defense. They also invigorate Brady enforcement by allowing trial judges
to actively manage discovery throughout the pretrial stage of the case.
The role of appellate judges in enforcing Brady is correspondingly
diminished.
One important implication of these local discovery rules is that
they may encourage parties, instead of behaving as adversaries, to
cooperate for both the public and defendants' good. These rules
structure ongoing discussions about discovery by requiring the parties
to meet and confer about discovery issues, to file joint discovery reports,
and to address discovery in court and on the record. Such discussions
educate prosecutors, give them a better idea of what disclosures the
defense needs to prepare its case, and ultimately help prosecutors to
comply with their Brady and other discovery violations. Such
collaboration should make discovery less adversarial and even more
inquisitorial.266 This lesson has not been lost on many judges; for
example, the stated purpose of the standing discovery order for the
District of New Jersey is "to encourage but not require both the
Government and the defense to provide discovery beyond that which is
required by law."267 There is reason to believe that many prosecutors,
who see themselves not only as adversaries but as ministers of justice in
265 See Grunwald, supra note 43 (citing the paucity of empirical research assessing the
effectiveness of broader discovery). However, some research has been encouraging. See, e.g.,
Turner & Redlich, supra note 43.
266 See Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISCOURSE 74, 81 n.31 (2013) (citing M6ximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal
Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal
Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004)).
267 D.N.J. Standing Order, supra note 77, at 5 9.
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discovery, will truly cooperate with the defense under a rules regime
that facilitates, guides, and encourages that cooperation.
Furthermore, all these local rule reforms taken together help
prosecutors to produce discovery early in the case. Rule 16 and Brady
require the production of discovery only in time to be used at trial.268
Neither do they require prosecutors to provide impeachment
information for use in plea bargaining.269 There is a circuit split on
whether Brady requires the prosecutor to provide exculpatory evidence
in plea bargaining, and the Supreme Court has not decided the
question.270 But many local rules require prosecutors to turn over
material within days of arraignment, and to hold an early joint discovery
conferences with the defense; judges help enforce early discovery
through pretrial discovery conferences early in the case that result in
discovery deadlines. This has the effect of adapting Rule 16 and Brady to
the plea bargaining context, a development of tremendous importance
considering that criminal trials have all but disappeared.
These findings dovetail with scholarship demonstrating that, the
longer a case drags on, the more prosecutors are invested in its outcome
and less inclined to turn over exculpatory evidence.271 The rules in some
districts that require early production of evidence, in general and of
exculpatory evidence in particular,272 thus require disclosure of
exculpatory material at a point in the case in which it is easier for
prosecutors to make such disclosures.273
Brady has traditionally been enforced by judges on appeal. But the
new local rules, by strengthening discovery obligations and
incorporating the Brady standard, have made it easier for trial judges to
enforce Brady. Prosecutors are more likely to prevail on Brady issues on
appeal because of finality concerns and the difficulty of proving that
withheld evidence would have changed the outcome, but the trial
judge's calculus is different. Judges who apply Brady pretrial do not ask
what would have changed the outcome; they ask what might yet change
the outcome. That latter question is much more similar to one of Rule
16 materiality. 274 Thus, trial judges, in an abundance of caution and with
268 See United States v. Beale, 921 F.2d 1412, 1426 (1991).
269 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (Constitution does not require pre-
guilty plea disclosure of impeachment information); Structuring, supra note 38, at 42-45.
270 James M. Grossman, Comment, Getting Brady Right: Why Extending Brady v. Maryland's
Trial Right to Plea Negotiations Better Protects a Defendant's Constitutional Rights in the
Modern Legal Era, 2016 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1525, 1542 (2016).
271 See Baer, supra note 60.
272 See, e.g., E.D.N.C. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 (requires disclosure within twenty-one days
and without a materiality requirement).
273 See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 9, at § 20.3(n) n.284.
274 See supra Section II.A.
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no finality concerns to distort their analysis, may be more inclined to
order the production of potentially exculpatory materials. This is
consistent with the American Bar Association Standard in Model Rule
3.8(d), which does away with materiality for exculpatory evidence and
requires the disclosure of "information" instead of admissible evidence.
Local rules also strengthen district judges because prosecutors
cannot easily litigate the validity of the rules. In the first place, that
would put prosecutors, who deal with the same judges every day, in the
uncomfortable position of challenging a rule before one of the very
judges who promulgated it. It does appear that in many districts judges
have sought prosecutorial input in the passage of local discovery rules,
but that has not stopped courts from passing many local discovery rules
similar to those that the Department of Justice has opposed on a
national level.
In short, local discovery rules effectively rebalance the system. They
empower defense attorneys with information to be better advocates for
their clients, they ensure that juries are better informed in adjudicating
cases, and they help judges to adjudicate and sentence more justly.
Broad criminal discovery makes the defense attorney a more effective
check on the prosecutor, and it permits defendants to make more
intelligent decisions about whether and on what terms to plead guilty.
Taken together, these local rule innovations strengthen Brady and
Rule 16 and expand their scope, move Brady enforcement out of the
appellate courts and into trial courts, and adapt Brady and Rule 16 to
plea bargaining, where they are most needed.
C. Fracture of Criminal Discovery Could Lead to National Reform
One advantage of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is that
they are uniform nationwide, so that justice should not vary depending
on where a case is litigated.275 Although local rules can address many
serious critiques of federal discovery, they also present a new challenge:
the fracture of federal discovery practice. This fracture could
conceivably cause similar cases prosecuted in different districts with
different discovery rules to have different case outcomes. Little research
has been done on this point, but at least one scholar has made a
convincing case for it.276 The problem is easy to imagine in the case of
local discovery rules that mandate early discovery. Defendants in
districts which mandate broad and early disclosures seem more likely to
275 Dession, I, supra note 9, at 700.
276 See, e.g., Meyn, supra note 54, at 1115-20. More empirical research is necessary to
determine to what extent outcomes between districts differ based on local discovery regimes.
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receive the discovery they need to fully prepare for plea bargaining than
defendants in other districts who may plead guilty without the benefit of
such disclosures.
Uniformity is concededly valuable where the national rules are fair
and effective. But as I have argued, the federal criminal discovery rules
are deficient, and many local discovery rules appear to be better. In this
context, at least, there appears to be a benefit to "federal federalism,"
whereby each district is a "rules laboratory"277 that can experiment with
procedural innovations. Perhaps the successful local discovery rules will
serve as patterns for nationwide reform.278 However, this laboratory
model of rulemaking is much less effective if the districts do not make
systematic attempts to evaluate the success of their rules innovations.279
For example, before 1993, several districts required some form of
mandatory initial disclosures in civil cases through local rules, standard
interrogatories, and standing orders.280 These diverse local innovations
eventually inspired a national rule that standardized the practice.281
Likewise, if the experience of broader disclosure districts continues to be
positive, hopefully Rule 16 will eventually be amended along the lines of
the local rule reforms described herein.282 The "siren song of
uniformity" should not distract us from our ultimate quest for better
procedure.283
277 See Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901 (2002)
(explaining how local rules become national rules); see also Robert G. Bone, The Process of
Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO.
L.J. 887, 897-900 (1999) (section entitled "The Golden Age of Court Rulemaking: 1950-1970").
278 Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J.
929 (1996) (considers procedural localism, the CJRA, and limits on congressional authority in
rulemaking); Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46
MERCER L. REV. 757, 759 (1995) (critiquing localism in rulemaking); Samuel P. Jordan, Local
Rules and the Limits of Trans-Territorial Procedure, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 415 (2010);
Richard Marcus, Confessions of a Federal "Bureaucrat": The Possibilities of Perfecting Procedural
Reform, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 103 (2007).
279 Subrin, supra note 198.
280 FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
281 Id. ("The rule is based upon the experience of district courts that have required
disclosure of some of this information through local rules, court-approved standard
interrogatories, and standing orders.").
282 For a thoughtful critique of this approach, see Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of
Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 642 (2017) ("Whether policy experimentation can be
expected to lead to socially beneficial outcomes depends on the balance between deliberative
information and political information and how that information is put to use.").
283 Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas 0. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not
Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 502
(2016).
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D. Exceeding the Legal Authority for the Revolution
An even more serious objection to local discovery rules is that
many of them may have been promulgated in violation of federal law.
The Rules Enabling Act and Criminal Rule 57 require that, when a
district court makes local rules, those rules must be "consistent with"
federal law.284 Even though several of these local discovery rules are
salutary, a few of them are not consistent with federal law. And perhaps
all of them taken together work such a large change in federal discovery
as to no longer be consistent with federal law.
Courts have not often considered the meaning of "consistent with"
in this context. 285 The First Circuit has tested consistency by asking
"first, whether the [federal rule and local rule] are textually inconsistent
and, second, whether the local rule subverts the overall purpose of the
federal rule."286 This approach accords with the 1944 Advisory
Committee Note to Criminal Rule 57: "While the rules are intended to
constitute a comprehensive procedural code for criminal cases in the
Federal courts, nevertheless it seemed best not to endeavor to prescribe
a uniform practice as to some matters of detail." It also accords with the
dictionary definition of the term, which includes not only "free from
variation" (a nonsensical interpretation for this context, because all local
rules vary from the federal rules) but also "compatible."287 Thus, local
rules should be deemed consistent with federal rules where they address
only "matters of detail" and are compatible with the text and purpose of
the federal rules.
Whether these local discovery rules confine themselves to "matters
of detail" is doubtful; several of them go beyond that. It could be argued
that the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure establish a comprehensive
discovery regime that, in conjunction with Brady and the Jencks Act,
carefully balances the relevant interests in discovery. Even small
variations from the Federal Rules could upset this delicate balance.
Three examples could be given that have already been discussed. First,
Rule 16 requires discovery requests, but several local rules abrogate that
requirement. Second, Rule 16 is conspicuously silent on deadlines for
pre-plea and pretrial discovery, instead giving courts authority to
regulate the timing of discovery case-by-case. However, many local rules
284 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 57(a)(1); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012).
285 See, e.g., Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Sup. Ct. of Pa., 975 F.2d 102, 107 (3d Cir. 1992).
But see Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mass., 214 F.3d 4, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) (striking down
local rule requiring judicial pre-approval of grand jury subpoenas for defense attorneys).
286 Whitehouse v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of R.I., 53 F.3d 1349, 1363 (1st Cir. 1995).
287 Consistent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY ONLINE, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/consistent (last visited Sept. 4, 2017).
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require the production of discovery long before trial.288 Thus, perhaps
local rule discovery deadlines that presumptively apply to each case
contradict that rule. Third, local rules that expand upon the list of items
to be disclosed in every case could be said to contravene Rule 16's
requirement that only specified categories must be disclosed in each
case.289 Fourth, although Rule 17 only permits pretrial discovery
conferences, many districts now require them.
If any one of these differences seems inconsequential, the
combined effect of all of the local rules is not. As I have argued in this
Article, the local discovery rules of many districts, when taken as a
whole, work a revolution in federal criminal discovery. They expand the
scope, accelerate the timing, and provide several procedural
mechanisms that greatly empower judges and defense attorneys to
influence, monitor, and check prosecutorial discovery decisions. These
local rules upset the old balance of discovery, putting a thumb on the
scale for both judges and defense attorneys. A revolution, by its nature,
goes well beyond mere "matters of detail."
On the other hand, one could argue that the local discovery rules
are still generally compatible with the spirit of Rule 16. Each Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure should be read in light of Rule 2's
interpretative canon that all rules, including Criminal Rule 57's
"consistent with" provision, should be interpreted "to provide for the
just determination of every criminal proceeding, to secure simplicity in
procedure and fairness in administration, and to eliminate unjustifiable
expense and delay."290 Read in that light, these local discovery rules
should be seen as "consistent with" the federal rules because they are
generally compatible with Rule 16 and they improve the quality of
justice and fairness of administration. Textual support for this point of
view can be found for local rule treatment of the scope and timing of
disclosures and pretrial discovery conferences.
As to scope of discovery, the Advisory Committee made clear in its
1974 Note that the rule generally set a floor, not a ceiling, on how much
discovery the court could order: "The rule is intended to prescribe the
minimum amount of discovery to which the parties are entitled. It is not
intended to limit the judge's discretion to order broader discovery in
appropriate cases." Local rules and local local rules about discovery are
288 See supra Section II.B.
289 In other words, while Rule 16 mentions the defendant's prior record and statements,
certain documents and objects, reports of examinations and tests, and expert discovery, many
local rules require the government to disclose search warrant materials, materials related to
identifications, and wiretap materials.
290 FED. R. CRIM. P. 2 (itself was a local rule innovation); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 17.1 advisory
committee's note to 1966 amendment ("Pretrial conferences are now being utilized to some
extent even in the absence of a rule.").
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arguably consistent with this idea of judicial discovery discretion.
Furthermore, judges can always decide in particular cases, on a showing
of good cause, to modify the application of a local discovery rule. 291
Likewise, as to timing, Rule 16 makes clear that the judge must
decide the appropriate timing in individual cases: "At any time the court
may, for good cause, deny, restrict, or defer discovery or inspection, or
grant other appropriate relief."292 If judges can decide timing in
individual cases, then they can make a generalized finding by local rule
that certain deadlines should be presumptively applicable to all cases,
and that generalized finding is consistent with Rule 16.
One matter of timing that local rules have not formally changed is
Jencks Act statements. Even in districts that advance the timing of other
discovery, local rules often expressly exempt Jencks material.293 Where
prosecutors have refused to turn over such material before the witness
testifies on direct examination, appellate courts have consistently
enforced the Jencks Act's strict timing requirement.294 Still, local timing
requirements can be seen as judges' way of pushing against Jencks, and
when judges require early discovery, prosecutors may be more likely not
to assert their rights under the Jencks Act.295
Finally, mandatory pretrial conferences are but a small step beyond
permissive ones. Criminal Rule 17.1 already gives the court discretion to
hold such conferences on its own motion, and the purposes of such
conferences include addressing discovery matters.296 The notion of all
the judges in a district deciding by local rule to do so in every case is not
incompatible with Rule 17.1.
Doing away with discovery requests by local rule, however, directly
and specifically contravenes Rule 16. Although such local rules would
291 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d).
292 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(1). True to the extent that local rules require production of
witness statements sooner than after the witness's direct examination, they violate the Jencks
Act. More research must be done into whether courts are forcing the early production of such
statements over the parties' objections.
293 See, e.g., D.N.H. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(e) ("[T]he government determines that
circumstances call for later disclosure as allowed by Rule 26.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3500."); M.D.
ALA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a)(2) (similar rule); cf N.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 14.1(e) ("The
Court requests that the government, and where applicable, the defendant, make materials and
statements subject to Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 3500 available to the other party at a
time earlier than rule or law requires to avoid undue delay at trial or hearings.").
294 See Ellen S. Podgor, Criminal Discovery of Jencks Witness Statements: Timing Makes a
Difference, 15 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 651, 669 (1999) (citing United States v. Algie, 667 F.2d 569, 570
(6th Cir. 1982)) (Jencks Act violated where judge, as matter of courtroom policy, ordered
prosecutors to disclose Jencks statement before trial).
295 Id. at 671 ("[P]rosecutors routinely do not contest court orders that require an early
release of Jencks material.").
296 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's note to 1966 amendment ("Where pretrial
hearings are used pursuant to Rule 17.1, discovery issues may be resolved at such hearings.").
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improve criminal justice, they seem to exceed the authority given to
courts under the Rules Enabling Act.
Regardless of whether these local rules violate federal law, a
practical point seems relevant here: local rules are rarely challenged or
overturned, either on appeal or by circuit judicial council.297 In
particular, I have been unable to find any examples of local criminal
discovery rules being thus challenged or overturned. It appears that this
lax enforcement of the Rules Enabling Act has been a good thing,
because discovery rule innovation has flourished. Many of these local
rules, tried in the laboratory of their home districts, may set the stage for
national discovery reform that improves federal criminal justice by
putting more discovery in the hands of the defense, earlier in the case.
This, in turn, should be expected to improve the functioning of the
adversary system for both trials and plea bargains.
CONCLUSION
While local rule reforms do indeed push the boundaries of the
Rules Enabling Act and go against nationwide uniformity, they could
also inspire national reform. These local rules give clear, enforceable
directives to prosecutors, and they better equip judges to carefully
monitor the parties' compliance. The rules make discovery obligations
more clear because they are more specific as to scope and timing. They
are better enforceable because the court can compel the production of
discovery, or order other sanctions, based on specific local rules and
case-specific discovery orders.
In a larger sense, the local rules greatly enlarge the procedural
importance of pretrial discovery. Rather than merely requiring the
parties to exchange discovery on request, the best local rules elevate
pretrial criminal discovery to its own distinct stage of the case, not
unlike what the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did to pretrial civil
discovery.298 The best local rules define the following process for this
pretrial discovery stage: the parties confer about discovery issues, the
scope and timing of disclosures and motions, and possible stipulations.
The court holds one or more discovery conferences (perhaps
concurrently with the arraignment or an already-scheduled pretrial
conference), and issues a discovery order that either memorializes the
297 LAURIE L. LEVENSON, FEDERAL CRIMINAL RULES HANDBOOK (2017) (section on Rule 57
collecting cases of local criminal rules that have been overturned); see also WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 75, at § 3153 ("[T]he problem of divergence between local and national rules has
remained.... Policing local divergences has proved difficult.").
298 I intend to explore the "civilization of criminal discovery" in a future article.
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parties' joint plan or modifies it as the judge sees fit. As the case
progresses, the parties should have expanded grounds for discovery
motions, both because they have conferred about discovery and because
the local rules and discovery orders provide specific direction about
what is to be produced and when. The local discovery rules tend to
provide for much broader discovery to the defense, although
prosecutors can seek to withhold certain discovery by invoking a
declination procedure.
Speaking broadly, these rules transform and revolutionize the
discovery process from one that is more based on individual
prosecutorial discretion about what and when to disclose, to a process
that involves more prosecutorial collaboration with (and accountability
to) defense attorneys and judges. This tends to "rebalance" the system
by reducing prosecutorial discretion in discovery and increasing the
ability of judges and defense attorneys to influence and regulate that
discretion.
As the national Rule 16 Survey shows, there is reason to believe
that these discovery rules, taken together, are working as intended; that
is, that prosecutors are complying with their discovery obligations and
turning over more material discovery at an earlier point in the case. Of
course, much more research remains to be done. If the rules are
working, then criminal defendants are better informed, earlier in the
case. They can thus prepare their cases better for plea bargaining or trial.
The local rules discussed herein should inspire a national
amendment to Rule 16 with the following features (set forth in greater
detail the Appendix):
The parties must confer about discovery and submit a joint
discovery plan (or separate proposed discovery orders) within seven
days of arraignment.
The prosecution must provide discovery within fourteen days of
the arraignment without a request; the defense must reciprocate within
fourteen days of receiving prosecution discovery.
The scope of Rule 16 discovery should be broadened to include
exculpatory evidence and a few other specific categories of evidence.
Exculpatory evidence should be turned over within fourteen days of
arraignment, but impeachment evidence must be turned over within
fourteen days of trial unless the court orders otherwise.
The court must hold a pretrial discovery conference within twenty-
one days of the arraignment and issue a discovery order detaining the
scope and timing of disclosures and motions.
The parties must put on the record what discovery they have
provided, what discovery they intend to provide and when, and what
discovery they intend not to provide at that time by invoking the
declination procedure.
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The parties must attempt to resolve discovery issues informally
before filing discovery motions.
A national amendment along these lines would vindicate the work
of local rules committees around the country.
Of course, the Department of Justice opposed amending Rule 16 
in
2007299 and would likely oppose these proposed amendments. However,
the local rules revolution is already underway: the experimentation 
of
district courts throughout the country has yielded many important
innovations with long track records. The fact is, many of these 
local
discovery rules strike a better procedural balance between the roles 
of
prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys. By improving 
defense access
to discovery while preserving prosecutors' ability to withhold or 
defer
disclosure on good cause, they may achieve more just results.
APPENDIX: MODEL PROVISIONS FOR AMENDING THE 
FEDERAL RULES
The following model provisions for national reform are based on
the local rules from various districts, with several changes of my own.
Except as noted, the additional language would be inserted 
into Rule 16.
A. Eliminate Discovery Requests
All discovery for which a request is currently required under Rule
16, as well as the notice required by Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
shall be provided to the opposing party without such a request.
B. Timing of Disclosures
All disclosures required by this rule shall be provided within
fourteen days of the arraignment or the defendant's not guilty plea,
whichever is later, unless the court orders otherwise, except 
that
impeachment evidence need only be disclosed in time for 
effective use at
trial.
299 Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, The Ethics of Prosecutorial 
Disclosure, 30 CRIM.
JUST. 41, 43 (2015).
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C. Scope of Disclosures by the Attorney for the Government
Within the time limits provided for under this rule, the attorney for
the government shall make the following disclosures:
Exculpatory Information. "All evidence or information known to
the attorney for the government that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused or mitigates the offense, and, in connection with sentencing,
disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating
information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is
relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal."300
A defendant may not waive discovery of exculpatory evidence
except in open court. The court may not accept the waiver unless the
court determines that (A) the proposed waiver is knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily offered; and (B) the interests of justice
require the proposed waiver.301
Search Warrants. "Any search warrants and supporting affidavits
that resulted in the seizure of evidence that is intended for use by the
government as evidence in its case-in-chief at trial or that was obtained
from or belongs to the defendant."302
Electronic Surveillance. (1) "[a] written description of any
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2510, relating to the charges in the indictment in which the
defendant was intercepted and a statement whether the government
intends to [use] any such communications as evidence in its case-in-
chief; and (2) a copy of any application for authorization to intercept
such communications relating to the charges contained in the
indictment in which the defendant was named as an interceptee or
pursuant to which the defendant was intercepted, together with all
supporting affidavits, the court orders authorizing such interceptions,
and the court orders directing the sealing of intercepted
communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(a)."303
Consensual Interceptions. (1) "[a] written description of any
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications, relating to the
charges contained in the indictment, made with the consent of one of
the parties to the communication ('consensual interceptions'), in which
the defendant was intercepted or which the government intends to [use]
in its case-in-chief. (2) [n]othing in this subsection is intended to
determine the circumstances, if any, under which, or the time at which,
300 MODEL RULES, supra note 26, at r. 3.8(d).
301 Based on the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. (2012),found in Joy, supra note 31.
302 D. HAW. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1(a).
303 D. MASS LOCAL R. 116.1(C)(1)(c).
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the attorney for the government must review and produce
communications of a defendant in custody consensually recorded by the
institution in which that defendant is held."304
Identifications. A written statement whether the defendant was a
subject of an investigative identification procedure used 
with a witness
the government anticipates calling in its case-in-chief 
involving a line-
up, show-up, photospread or other display of an 
image of the
defendant. ... If the defendant was a subject of such a procedure, a copy
of any videotape, photospread, image or other tangible evidence
reflecting, used in or memorializing the identification procedure.305
D. Discovery Conference Between Parties
Within seven days of the arraignment or the defendant's not guilty
plea, whichever comes later, the parties shall confer about discovery,
including the scope and timing of all discovery described in this rule
and any other discovery matters potentially relevant to a just and timely
resolution of the case.30
6
Within fourteen days of the arraignment or the defendant's not
guilty plea, whichever comes later, the attorney for the 
government shall
file a Joint Statement of Discovery Conference, described in this rule,
signed by counsel for each side, generally describing all discovery
material that has been or will be exchanged, including the dates of such
exchanges, and setting forth all agreements and stipulations entered into
at the conference.
If the parties are not able to agree on a Joint Statement of Discovery
Conference, they must each file (1) a report on each of the foregoing
items and (2) a proposed order regulating discovery in the case.
E. Joint Statement of Discovery Conference (Certification of
Compliance)
The Joint Statement of Discovery Conference must certify 
that the
parties met and conferred about discovery and must 
report on each of
the following items
30 7 :
1) the specific time, date, and place at which the offense(s)
304 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(C)(1)(d).
305 D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.1(C)(1)(f).
306 The following proposed language is based largely on the Southern 
District of Florida's
local discovery rules. S.D. FLA. LOCAL R. 88.10.
307 Based on W.D. OKLA. LOCAL R. CRIM. P. 16.1 and Appendix V.
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charged is (are) alleged to have been committed;
2) any contested issues of discovery and inspection raised by
any party;
3) any additional discovery or inspection desired by any party;
4) the fact that the prosecution has made disclosure to the
defense of the following:
a) all items listed above in "scope of disclosures by the
attorney for the government" and all items
currently listed in Rule 16, except that the
government may decline to disclose any such
evidence or information by invoking the
declination procedure described in this rule;
b) the existence or nonexistence of any evidence
obtained through electronic surveillance or wiretap;
c) the contemplated use of the testimony of an
informer (include only the fact an informer exists
and not the name or testimony thereof);
d) the general nature of any evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts the government intends to
introduce at trial pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 404(b);
and
e) the prior felony convictions of any witness the
government intends to call in its case-in-chief;
5) notice of alibi;
6) notice of insanity defense or expert testimony of
defendant's mental condition;
7) notice of defense based on public authority; and
8) the deadlines for all disclosures.
Counsel for both parties must truthfully state that they presently
know of no additional discovery issues.
Counsel must expressly acknowledge their continuing obligation to
disclose any materials that become known to counsel during the course
of the pretrial investigation of this cause.
The Joint Statement of Discovery Conference shall contain a
proposed order memorializing all agreements made by the parties at
their discovery conference.
F. Meet and Confer Requirement for Discovery Motions
All motions for discovery or inspection shall contain a certification
that counsel have engaged in a discovery conference and discussed the
subject matter of each motion and have been unable, after a good faith
effort, to reach agreement of the resolution of the issues. The
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certification for the motion shall set forth: (1) the statement that the
prescribed conference was held; (2) the date of the conference; (3) the
names of the parties who attended the conference; and (4) the matters
which are in dispute and which require the determination of the court.
The filing of any such motion for further discovery or inspection which
does not include the required certification may result in summary denial
of the motion or other sanctions.
308
G. Declination of Disclosure
If in the judgment of a party it would be detrimental to the
interests of justice to make any of the disclosures required by these rules,
such disclosures may be declined, before or at the time that disclosure is
due, and the opposing party advised in writing, with a copy filed in the
Clerk's Office, of the specific matters on which disclosure is declined
and the reasons for declining. If the opposing party seeks to challenge
the declination, that party shall file a motion to compel that states the
reasons why disclosure is sought. (Such motion shall comply with the
meet and confer requirements of for discovery motions.) Upon the
filing of such motion, except to the extent otherwise provided by law,
the burden shall be on the party declining disclosure to demonstrate, by
affidavit and supporting memorandum citing legal authority, why such
disclosure should not be made. The declining party may seek leave to
file its submissions in support of declination under seal for the court's
in-camera consideration. Unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
redacted version of each such submission shall be served on the moving
party, which may reply.
This rule does not preclude any party from moving, ex parte, for
leave to file an ex parte motion for a protective order with respect to any
discovery matter. Nor does this rule limit the court's power to accept or
reject an ex parte motion or to decide such a motion in any manner it
deems appropriate.
309
308 To be inserted into FED. R. CRiM. P. 12. This proposed language is based largely on the
Western District of Washington's meet and confer procedure. W.D. WASH. LOCAL R. CRIM. 
P.
16(f).
309 This proposed language is based largely on the District of Massachusetts' declination
procedure. D. MASS. LOCAL R. 116.6(A).
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H. Pretrial Conferences Regarding Discovery
Within seven days of the receiving the Joint Statement of Discovery
Conference, the court shall issue an order addressing (1) the timing and
scope of all disclosures required by Rule 16 and (2) discovery motion
deadlines. The court shall address discovery at all pretrial conferences.
The court may hold one or more additional pretrial conferences
regarding discovery."'
I. Sanctions for Discovery Violations
For failure to timely provide exculpatory information under this
rule, the court may order the following remedies: (i) postponement or
adjournment of the proceedings; (ii) exclusion or limitation of
testimony or evidence; (iii) a new trial; (iv) dismissal of any or all counts
with or without prejudice; (v) fines on the attorney; or (vi) any other
remedy determined appropriate by the court.
In fashioning a remedy under this subsection, the court shall
consider the totality of the circumstances, including-(i) the seriousness
of the violation; (ii) the impact of the violation on the proceeding; (iii)
whether the violation resulted from innocent error, negligence,
recklessness, or knowing conduct; and (iv) the effectiveness of
alternative remedies to protect the interest of the defendant and of the
public in assuring fair prosecutions and proceedings.
Fines may only be imposed for violations that were negligent,
reckless, or knowing. The imposition of fines is not to be deemed a
finding of contempt unless so designated by the court.311
310 To be inserted into FED. R. CRiM. P. 17.1.
311 See Joy, supra note 31, at 40.
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